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We were short-cutting across old Wyoming dirt roads and
hardly altered our 55-mile-an-hourpace. But the scene did not
change. It was like being in a trance-traveling strenuously,
but getting nowhere. So this was Wyoming, I thought, a secret,
hidden world unknown to the rest of the country, serene and
calm, with a slow heart beat.
-Mary

O'Hara'

INTRODUCTION

I. Rocky Mountain Growth and the Acquisition of Open Space
Wyoming and the Rocky Mountain West 2 are secrets no more.'
Some of Colorado's mountain communities grew four hundred and
fifty percent between 1960 and 1990, 4 and the state's overall population may surge another fifty percent by 2020.' Land is so popular, and

1. PHIL ROBERTS ET AL., WYOMING ALMANAC 158 (Bruce Seivers & LaVerne Roberts, eds., 3d
ed. 1994) (quoting Wyoming author Mary O'Hara).
2. For purposes of this comment, the "Rocky Mountain West" includes Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Utah and Wyoming. The authors address the concerns of towns and communities near the
heart of the Rocky Mountain range, bordering national forests or public lands.
By way of example, this comment will use the Town of Jackson in Teton County,
Wyoming. Between 1970 and 1990, Teton County's population increased from 4,823 to roughly
14,000. Jackson/Teton County Comprehensive Plan at 2-2 [hereinafter Plan]. With a rising
population and cost of living, a housing shortage, and Wyoming's lowest unemployment rate,
Teton County and Jackson "are perhaps the most dramatic examples of the explosive growth
seen in parts of Wyoming since its recovery from the mineral bust in the mid-1980s." Jackson
Experiences Explosive Growth, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Nov. 7, 1993, at BI. Jackson is particularly
susceptible to growth-related problems because 97% of the land in Teton County is federally
owned. Plan, supra, at 3-2. Jackson is not the only town in Wyoming that seeks to control
growth. Michael Riley, Story Residents Debate How to Control Growth, CASPER STAR-TRIB.,
Nov. 4, 1994, at BI.
3. The authors apologize for drawing excessive attention to Wyoming's special features and
excellent quality of life. In 1971, Bill Moyers recognized:
Many people in Wyoming refuse to boast about the grandeur of the state. They do not
want to encourage migration of newcomers ....
They want to keep the mountains and
prairies and rivers as free as possible of the excrescence of urban progress. Tourists are
welcome because they come and go, gracing the state with their money and their departure. I hardly blame the natives. I even hope they succeed.
ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 1, at 156 (citing Bill Moyers, Listening to America 155 (1971)). At this
point, Wyoming and the Rocky Mountain's secrets have not gone un-noticed. If nothing else, the
authors hope to demonstrate the pressing need to guide growth and development in order to preserve
the pristine character of many western lands and the unique charm of its towns.
4. Jeffco Seeks Comment on Master Plan, DENVER POST, Jan. 11, 1995, at B1. Colorado's La
Plata County is growing by thirty-five percent annually. La Plata Exceeds Expectations With 35 Percent Growth Rote, DENVER POST, Nov. 19, 1994, at B9.
5. This is an increase of almost 1.5 million. Al Knight, BOOM: We Wanted It. We Got It.
Now What Do We Do With It?, DENVER POST, Oct. 23, 1994, at I0A.
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scarce, in Jackson, Wyoming, the average price of a single family
home now exceeds half a million dollars. 6
The western population boom has most dramatically affected small
mountain communities.? Historically, agriculture, ranching and mining
assumed prominent roles in the West.8 Consequently, Rocky Mountain
inhabitants have enjoyed close and unique ties with the land, 9 making
property rights extremely important and sharply contested.' 0
Today, Rocky Mountain property is valued for preservation as
well as exploitation." Urbanites 2 from all parts of the country are fed
6. Home Prices Skyrocket in Jackson, LARAMIE BOOMERANG, Oct. 23, 1994, at 10. In the first half

of 1994, the average cost of one hundred single-family homes sold in Jackson was $561,485. Id. See also
Timothy Egan, Housing PricesSteepen as Jackson Hole Booms, DENVER POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at 4C. But
seeRumorsofitsDeath... ,SUMMIT PERSPECTIVES REAL EST. & DEV. INJACKSON HOLE, SepL, 1994, at 1.
At the end of the second quarter of 1994, 381 properties (single-family homes, condominiums, and residential lots) were sold in Teton County. The average price for these properties was $330,307. Id.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. See CHARLES F. WIJWNsON. CROSSNG THE NEXT ME IAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE or
THE WEST (1992); Stephen D. Alfers, Accommodation or Preemption?State and Federal Control of
Private Coal Lands in Wyoming, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 73, 88 (1977); Sara F. Bates, Public
Lands Communities: In Search of a Community of Values, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81, 85-88 (1993);
Richard Conniff, FederalLands. NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1994, at 2.
9. Dean Frank J. Trelease's preface in the maiden issue of the LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
appropriately characterized many of the factors surrounding western life and law:
The background map on the cover of the LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW symbolizes this new
journal's aims and interests. The terrain shown includes many typical features of the western
United States. Man's works are there-farms, ranches, cities, highways, irrigation reservoirs,
hydroelectric and steam power plants, oil and gas fields, coal, iron, and uranium mines. Underlying these are the mountains, plains, lakes, rivers and trout streams from which he derives both
his wealth and his recreation. Private lands lie adjacent to the public domain and the National
Forests. The LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW will be devoted to the law of the development and

conservation of these resources and the regulation of these activities.
Frank J. Trelease, Preface, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. v (1966).
Although changing rapidly, the Western United States is predominantly undeveloped, and in
such a place "an inseparable relationship exists between owning land and a way of life that land
ownership makes possible." James B. Wadley & Pamela Falk, Lucas and Environmental Land Use
Controls in Rural Areas: Whose Land is it Anyway?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 331, 341 (1993).
10. Norma Williamson, Development Permits Spark Duboi Debate: Public Response Runs
Against ProposedSystem, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Apr. 7, 1995, at B3. The Jackson/Teton County Comprehensive Plan passed by a nine percent margin. Jackson Residents FavorZoning Code, CASPER STARTRIB., Feb. 2, 1995, at B3.
11. There is a shift from exploiting the land's mineral or timber resources to preserving the
land for its potential to generate tourist dollars and preserve aesthetic and environmental values. See,
e.g., Raymond Rasker, Rural Development, Conservation, and Public Policy in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 6 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 109 (1993).
12. Californians are commonly blamed for the region's growth. From 1992-93, 154,200 people left
California for relocation in Arizona (20,900), Colorado (23,500), Idaho (11,300), Montana (2,000), Nevada
(29,200), New Mexico (4,600), Oregon (25,400), Utah (9,400), Washington (27,100) and Wyoming (800).
Paul Larmer & Ray Ring, Can PlanningRein in a Stampede?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at A6.
See also Ed Quillen, We're Threatenedby Migrants, Too, So We Need Proposition 781. DENVER PoST, Nov.
20, 1994, at 4F ("The main source of our migrant problem is California.").
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up with crime-ridden, congested cities and seek more serene lives in
the Rockies. 3 Low crime, low taxes, and majestic settings, such as
Wyoming's Teton and Wind River mountains, have emerged as the
area's most alluring attractions.
6
The region's recent popularity" brings welcome economic growth,'
but it also creates formidable complications. There are fewer affordable
housing units, 7 increased traffic congestion, pollution,'i depleted water
resources, 19 vanishing wildlife,' and disappearing open space.' Affluent
13. Time displayed a full-page photograph of a former New York City resident talking shop on
his celular telephone with the Tetons clearly in view from his Jackson, Wyoming, deck. Jordan
Bonfante, Sky's The Limit, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 21; See also James M. Clash, Jackson Hole; Playgroundfor the 400, FORBES, Oct. 17, 1994, at 356. Western perspectives were quite different in 1957.
In describing the west, Powell, Wyoming-born poet Alan Swallow wrote: "As a region we suffer too
greatly, still, from our common plagues: distance, isolation, colonialism of dependance upon what is
the fashion outside our region, the movement of our people elsewhere." ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 1,
at 152 (citing A Magazine for the West (Autumn, 1957)).
14. Early explorers recognized the awesome landscape:
[When we had reached Pacific Springs, the Wind River mountains appeared in marvelous
majesty. It was one of the sights of the journey. The huge purple hangings of rain-clouds
in the northern sky set off their vast proportions, and gave prominence, as in a stereoscope, to their gigantic forms and their upper heights, hoar with the frosts of the ages.
SIt RICHARD BURTON, WANDERINGS INTHREE CONTINENTS 165 (1901). See also Kevin McCullen, Best Place
CouldBe Any Place You Can Afford, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 21, 1993, at 34. But see Ellen Uzelac,
Pioneers Today Don'tAll FindHome on the Range, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 29, 1994, at Al (reporting some
newcomers have realized that the rural western lifestyle is not suited for everyone).
15. See, e.g., Bonfante, supra note 13; Elliot Diringer, Crowd on the New Frontier:Elbow
Room Running Out, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 15, 1994, at Al.
16. See Tom Morton, Report: State Enjoys Solid Growth in Jobs, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Oct. 14,
1994, at Al.
17. See Gregory Jaynes, Down and Out in Telluride, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 60 (reporting that "in
America's tourist boomtowns, low wages and high rents are leaving the working class out in the cold.").
See also Robert Weller, Colorado Ski Town Okays Car Camping Despite Protests, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Oct.
16, 1994, at B2. For a discussion of the problems land-use regulations can create for affordable housing see
generally Timothy J. Choppin, Note, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier: Policies to
Promote Affordable Housing in Suburbs, 82 GEO. L.J. 2039 (1994).
18. Mark Obmascik, Gloomy Shapes Seen in Denver's Brown Cloud, DENVER POST, Oct. 24,
1994, at Al0.
19. The prior appropriation system, which governs most Rocky Mountain states, has exacerbated an already short supply of water. See generally NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE
COLORADO RIVER COMPACr AND ThE POLITICS OF WATER IN11E AMERICAN WEST (1975); MARC RasNER, THE
CADILLAC DESERT (1993); Mark W. Tader, Note, Reallocating Western Water: Beneficial Use, Property,
and Politics, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 277 (1986). Wyoming was a major player in the development of
Western water law. See, e.g., Mark Squillace, One Hundred Years of Wyoming Water Law, 26 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 93, 94-95 (1991).
20. One author recognized that "rampant destruction of wildlife habitat has ruined entire ecosystems and helped place 796 individual species of animals and plants on endangered and threatened
lists." Carole Douglis, Images of Home, WILDERNESS, Fall 1993, at 11, 12.
21. Diringer, supra note 15, at A16 ("open space threatened by influx"); Tom Knudson, 2
Reformers Seeking to PreserveScenic Beauty: Regional Solution May be Crucial,SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 15, 1993, at A16; Gordon Oliver, Oregonians, Others Grapple With Challenges of Growth, THE
OREGONIAN, Feb. 4, 1994, at B4.
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seasonal homeowners 22 also create a transient population that frustrates the
existing sense of community and increases property values to the point of
excluding long-time residents.23
Preservation of open space helps prevent rampant development and
protects western towns from urban homogenization." Requiring developers to
dedicate land, in return for a permit to subdivide or build, has become a
common method to preserve valuable open space.' Such a dedication is
called an exaction and requires a landowner to donate land, or money, when
he or she exacerbates a public need. But, exactions strike discord with those
who believe the public should bear the burden of such acquisitions. Making
property regulation in the West even tougher, western politicians accuse the
Clinton administration of waging a "war on the West,"' reflecting that
western property owners are already weary of land controls.'
State courts have been upholding the constitutionality of conditional
land exactions for some time,' but the U.S. Supreme Court recently
22. Celebrities, CEOs and prominent politicians have temporary homes in the Rocky Mountain
Region. Give Me a Home Where the Celebrities Roam, TIME, May 31, 1993, at 17. President
Clinton, however, passed over Jackson as a vacation spot because the ranch of Deputy Secretary
Roger C. Altman was "too far from restaurants, shopping malls and golf courses." Walter Shapiro,
The Ploys of Summer: How the Clintons Can Get a Good Vacation Cheap, WASHINGTON POST, Aug.
15, 1993, at C4. See also Plan, supra note 2, at 3-1.
23. Michael Riley, Beauty Drives up Story Land Values, CASPER STAR-TRmB., Dec. 6, 1993, at Bl;
Deborah Frazier, Ranch 'Culture' Fading Away, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Nov. 9, 1993, at Cl. One Western
perspective columnist said: "We used to have funky, ramshackle towns like Salida, Aspen and Durango
where the people who worked there could also afford to live there. Come the emigres, and these once-solid
and stable communities immediately start to deteriorate." Quillen, supra note 12.
24. Mary George, Open Space Growth Hailed in Boulder, DENVER POST, Jan. 11, 1995, at Bl.
25. Jeffco Seeks Comment on Master Plan, DENVER POST, Jan. 11, 1995, atBI ("We're not just
going to say provide open space; we're going to say provide X amount of open space in this part of
the county."). See infra note 66.
26. Newly elected United States Senator, Craig Thomas, among others, claims that Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt is waging a war on the West over control of the public lands. Local
landowners resent land policy originating in Washington, D.C. See Paul Krza, Whippin' up Wars, in
Wyo & West (editorial), CASPER STAR-TRIB., Nov. 18, 1993, atA6; Candy Moulton, Watt: Westerners
are 'learning to fear our government,' CASPER STAR-TRI., Nov. 19, 1993, at Al; Michael Riley,
Wallop Blasts Babbitt in Farm Bureau Visit, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Nov. 14, 1993, at Bl.
Western politicians have always played a controversial role in western resource development.
In describing the Reclamation Act and its progeny, one author wrote:
Faraway bureaucracies with fabulous budgets would dictate the future of the West, and all
the while Western politicians, while making rich careers out of fed-bashing, would see to it
that the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the federal land agencies remained true to the twin causes of urbanization and industrialization across the developing West. The results were ecocide ....
Donald Snow, Wallace Stengner's "Geography of Hope," 24 ENVLT. L. xi, xv (1994).
27. In fact, most rural landowners are inherently skeptical of land use planning because they
view it as a "urban oriented institution." Wadley & Falk, supra note 9. at 343-45. Park County,
Wyoming's land use plan was aborted after the "guardians of private property threw a fit." Diringer,
supra note 15, at A17.
28. See, e.g., Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668 (Colo.
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changed this practice by tilting the national balance in favor of private
landowners.

9

In Dolan v. City of Tigard,3" the Court solidified its recent

positions that private property rights shall receive more meaningful protection. 3' But in so doing, the Court imposed greater restraints on local
governments and conservationists who yearn to corral Rocky Mountain
development.32 Dolan is a momentous decision for landowners and planners alike because it applies to building and subdivision permits conditioned on exactions." These exactions are used by towns seeking land for
schools, parks, sewers, streets, sidewalks, and open space.
This comment introduces the practice of land-use planning using
conditional land exactions. It explains the regulatory takings doctrine, and
the doctrine's limitation on the power to exact, culminated by the Court's
most recent foray on exactions, Dolan v. City of Tigard. The comment
demonstrates that Dolan puts towns in the untenable position of proving
an exaction's constitutionality, encouraging undue judicial scrutiny of

1981); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1949); Allen v. Stockwell, 178 N.W.
27 (Mich. 1920); Billings Properties, Inc., v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964); Village of
Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Shirley, 791 P.2d 466 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); Brous v. Smith, 106 N.E.2d
503, 506-07 (N. Y. 1952); Banbeny Dev. Corp. v. City of South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981); Call
v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
29. Many commentators will protest this new balance. See, e.g., Lawrence Walters, The Taking
Issue in the Ninth Circuit After Lucas. 24 ENVTL. L. 1325, 1349 (1994) ("The Fifth Amendment is simply
not a panacea for property owners who object to land use or natural resource regulation."). Others will
rejoice. See, e.g., James S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters-Is
It Against Nature to Payfor a Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309 (1992).
30. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987) ("our opinions do not establish that [the standard of review in takings cases] is the same as those applied to due process or equal protection claims"); Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). See also Joseph L. Sax, PropertyRights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1993) ("the
cases demonstrate that the current Court takes property rights seriously"). But see Hope M. Babcock,
Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drainedthe Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?:The Impact of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) ("Those who view Lucas as a cataclysmic decision for environmental
regulation may be in danger of reading too much into the creation of a new categorical rule based on
economic value and too little into the exceptions to that rule.") (footnotes omitted).
32. In 1988, Professor Rudolph recognized that the Supreme Court had "substantially increase[d] the
anxiety levels of local governing bodies." E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear it for Due Process-An Up to
Date Primer on Regulatory Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355, 355 (1988).
33. In Dolan, Justice Stevens noted, "Itihe mountain of briefs that the case has generated
nevertheless make itobvious that the pecuniary value of [Mrs. Dolan's] victory is far less important
than the rule of law that this case has been used to establish. It is unquestionably an important case."
Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 296-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dolan's applicability to
money exactions. See infra notes 272-295 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dolan's application to pre-annexation agreements.
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their legislative goals. The authors illustrate the practical effects of
Dolan's holding by presenting examples of conditional land exactions
used by the Town of Jackson, Wyoming, and applying Dolan to them.
Finally, the authors assess Dolan's potential effect on pre-annexation
agreements and money exactions, but argue that Dolan does not provide
the proper analytical foundation to judge the constitutionality of a money
exaction. The authors conclude that Dolan impedes the ability to preserve
open space and community character in the Rocky Mountain West, when
the need for that ability is most crucial.

BACKGROUND

L Land-use Planning & Acquiring Open Space through ConditionalExactions

The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that the state police power'
gleaned from the Tenth Amendment35 justifies land-use regulation.3 6 Because the police power is notably broad,3" the Court historically defers3"
34. The police power extends generally to matters regarding the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). See also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).
While the police power is the exclusive domain of the state; all states, including those
in the Rocky Mountain Region, have delegated to cities and counties the power to enact landuse ordinances and regulations. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-23-301 to -313 (1986);
IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6501 to -6533 (1989 and Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-101
(1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-21-1 to -26 (Michie 1978 and Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 151-701 (1977). See also PETER W. SALSICH, JR., LAND USE REGULATION: PLANNING, ZONING,
SUBDIVISION REGULATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, § 1.03 (Wendy Bliss & Joan Goldsmith eds., 1991).
35. Although not specifically enumerated in the Tenth Amendment, State police power is
a matter of constitutional interpretation. Before the U.S. Constitution was ratified, each state
existed as a sovereign entity, fully enjoying and exercising the powers that accompany sovereign status. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II. But, when the states ratified the Constitution, they expressly delegated certain powers to the federal government and retained powers that
were not delegated. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated . . .are reserved to the
States."). The Constitution does not expressly delegate the police power to the federal government. The Tenth Amendment reserves the police power to the states because, as sovereigns, the
states regulated matters of internal police.
36. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). See also Eubank v.
City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Willison v.
Cooke, 130 P. 828 (Colo. 1913); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985).
37. Justice William 0. Douglas opined: "An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits
is fruitless. . . ." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).

38.

See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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to state property39 regulations. Pursuant to this power, communities may
devise a comprehensive land-use plan to guide property development.' A
comprehensive plan is a broad scheme that supports regulations establishing the type and degree of allowable land use. 4t A local planning commission drafts the plan, and a legislative body enacts it. 42 The plan con-

39. The concept of "property" is not static because property involves numerous rights and
foundations. For example, "a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). In addition, property rights "are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
Constitutionally protected property interests are only those which society deems worthy of
legal protection. Kaiser Aena v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (citing United States v.
Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) ("not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only
those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them, and only when they are so
recognized may courts . . . compensate for their invasion."); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571-72, 576-77 (1972). See also Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference
with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1987) (property interests
created by federal statute in public resources).
Wesley N. Hohfeld postulated that property represents people's relationship to things,
and the relationship is of an aggregate of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 746-47 (1917). The Restatement of Property adopts this view. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introduction, at 3 (1936) ("'property' . . . denote[s] legal relations between persons with respect to a thing."). Within this aggregate of rights, the Supreme Court has
held "the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the government cannot take without compensation." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180-81. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982); Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
In 1689, John Locke wrote: "The labour that was mine ....
hathftxed my Property .
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). The Court protects

"reasonable investment backed expectations," indicating its recognition of Locke's concept that investment of labor or money creates property rights worthy of protection. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). See also generally Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudenceof Takings,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988).

40. Plan, supra note 2, at 1-1.
41. John R. Nolon, ComprehensiveLand Use Planning:Learning How and Where to Grow, 13
PACE L. REV. 351, 361-64 (1993). See also DANiEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, §§ 3.01, 3.18
(3d ed. 1993). The Wyoming Legislature defines land-use planning as "the process which guides the
growth and development of an area and assures the best and wisest use of that area's resources now
and in the future." WYO. STAT. § 9-8-102(a)(vi) (1982).
42. See generally Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 514 P.2d 111, 116 (Cal.
1973). The Wyoming State Legislature mandated comprehensive planning but was silent on implementation measures:
(a)

All local governments shall develop a local land use plan within their jurisdiction.

The plans shall be consistent with established state guidelines and be subject to review and
approval by the commission.
(b) All incorporated cities and towns shall have the option to develop a land use plan in
accordance with the requirements of W.S. 9-8-302(a), or cooperate with the county to
develop such a plan under W.S 9-8-302(b).
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templates a community's long-term vision, character,43 economics, natural
resources, and geographic surroundings.' It is a long-term guide to physical, social, and economic development. 45 Reviewing courts prefer comprehensive planning to randomly enacted land-use regulations because the
plan demonstrates judicious procedure. '
In a separate, but integrated document, local governments assemble land-use regulations to achieve the goals and policies in the plan.47
These may include zoning48 and subdivision regulations,49 building
codes," aesthetic controls,5 ' historic preservation laws, 52 and overlay
districts. 3

(c) All counties shall develop a countywide land-use plan which shall incorporate the
land use plans of all incorporated cities and towns within the county.
WYO. STAT. § 9-8-301 (1982). Other western states also have mandated comprehensive planning.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-23-206 (1990 Supp.); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6503, 6504, 6508 (1990
Supp.). For a discussion of comprehensive land use planning in the East see generally Robert Crespi,
Comment, Land Use Law in New York State: Playing "Hide & SEQRA with the Elusive Comprehensive Plan, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 835 (1994).
43. Justice Douglas said that a city could zone to create a 'quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted." Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
44. The Town of Jackson's Comprehensive Plan addresses nine factors: community vision,
population, economy and growth, community character, natural and scenic resources, affordable
housing, commercial and resort development, community facilities, transportation, and intergovemmental coordination. Plan, supra note 2, at 1.
45. Id.
46. MANDELKER, supra note 41, § 3.02.
47. Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (Or. 1973). See also SALSICH, supra
note 34, § 2.04; MANDELKER, supra note 41, § 3.01; Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
The Jackson land use regulations state: "The purpose of these Land Development Regulations is to implement the Comprehensive Plan and to promote the health, safety, and general welfare
of the present and future inhabitants of the Town." Town of Jackson Land Development Regulations,
art. I, div. 1200 (1994) [hereinafter Land Development Regulations].
48. Zoning is the division of a community into districts and the regulation of the land according to its uses. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985). See also, e.g.,
COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65-101 to -106 (1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6511 (1975); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-101 to -402 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-21-1 to -26 (1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 10-9-401 to -408 (1953); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-8-301 to -302 (1977).
49. SALSICH, supra note 34, § 8.01. Subdivision regulation is similar to zoning except that
subdivision regulations use predetermined specifications and "performance standards" rather than
territorial divisions. SALSICH, supra note 34. § 8.01. Subdivision regulations focus on the specific details of land development, rather than on types of use. SALSICH, supra note 34, § 8.01. See also,
e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65-101 to -106 (1970); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-101 to -612
(1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-20-1 to -16 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-801 to -811 (1953);
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-5-301 to -315 (1977).
50. Building codes are laws, ordinances, or regulations setting forth standards and requirements "for the construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use or appearance of buildings, premises, and dwelling units." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 195 (6th ed. 1990). See Standard Mining &
Dev. Corp. v. Auburn, 510 P.2d 647 (Wash. 1973). See also, e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-32-701
to -717 (1970); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-60-101 to -801 (1993).
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To countervail the burdens on public accommodations and services
caused by new development, a town also may require a land or money
exaction from a developer in return for a permit to improve, develop, or
subdivide his property.' Specifically, exactions include land dedications,"5
fees-in-lieu of land dedications, 56 impact fees, 7 and linkage fees. 8 A town
allocates the cost of public services and accommodations to a developer
because new development amplifies problems a town may constitutionally
correct, regulate, or prevent.5 9 This is justifiable because land developers
benefit from developing their land.'
51. Early courts refused to uphold aesthetic ordinances. See generally Comment, Exercise of
the Police Power for Aesthetic Purposes, 30 YALE L.J. 171, 172 (1920). More recently, however,
Justice Douglas stated: "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as ... carefully patrolled." Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. There is no longer
an issue regarding whether a state may constitutionally regulate land use for aesthetic purposes. Id.
See also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
52. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); South of Second
Assocs. v. Georgetown, 580 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1978) (holding historic preservation ordinance constitutional but void for vagueness). See also, e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-47.1-517, 24-80.1-102 to
-108 (1970); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-6-101 to -801 (1993); National Historic Preservation Act of
1996, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1966).
53. Overlay districts involve new regulations applied to areas with existing regulations to
address special needs. See generally City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 887 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Ark.
1994); Jachimek v. County of Maricopa, 819 P.2d 487, 490 (Ariz. 1991); Morehart v. County of
Santa Barbara, 872 P.2d 143 (Cal. 1994); Southampton v. Equus Assocs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716
(N.Y. 1994); Yamhill County v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comn'n, 839 P.2d 238, 240-41 (Or.
Ct. App. 1992); Overlake Fund v. City of Bellvue, 855 P.2d 706, 708 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
54. Much of the cost is for infrastructure expansion and improvement, including the acquisition
of open space. See generally R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments:A Brief History of Land Development Exactions,
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1987); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 519, 528 (1988).
55. The city may require the landowner to grant an easement, or it may require the landowner
to grant some land in fee. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See also Taub, supra note 54, at 520-21.
56. In-lieu fees are appropriate when the subdivision is too small to donate land. Taub, supra
note 54, at 521. They are available only in place of a land dedication. Taub, supra note 54, at 522.
57. An impact fee is appropriate when the subdivision is not primarily responsible for, but
contributes to, the particular problem or need of the town. Pavelko, supra note 59. They are also
used to generate revenue for facilities the developments necessitates. Taub, supra note 54, at 522.
They have been used to fund a far greater number of services than land dedications or in-lieu fees.
Taub, supra note 54, at 522.
58. Linkage fees are another off site development exaction which are commonly used to
provide for low income housing. Taub, supra note 54, at 524. See generally Jerold S. Kayden
& Robert Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis: The Connection
Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987). See also
infra notes 297-309 and accompanying text for an analysis of whether Dolan should apply to
money exactions.
59. Thomas M. Pavelko, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U.J.
URB. & ComrEMP. L. 269, 278 (1983). See also Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding in lieu-fee valid in exchange for the privilege of converting a resid-
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Exactions must achieve a public purpose or alleviate a public harm.6

Common purposes include streets, 62 schools, 63 low-income housing, 64 and

parks for recreation.65 In the face of rising population and waning public coffers, issuing building and subdivision permits conditioned on exactions has
become a popular method to preserve vital open space.'
11. ConstitutionalLimits on the Power to Exact: The Takings Clause and
Its Judicial Interpretations

Two separate clauses within the Fifth Amendment limit a state's
authority to regulate land use.67 First, although not recently used, 68 the
ential hotel to other uses); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (easement dedication requirement held not a taking but a reciprocal exchange since developer
would profit from building on the land).
60. Pavelko, supra note 59, at 270; Ira Michael Heyman & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1121 (1964); Bernard V. Keenan & Peter A. Buchsbaum, Report of
the Subcommittee on Exactions and Impact Fees, 23 URB. LAW. 627 (1991).
61. SALSICH, supra note 34, § 8.07.
62. The city may actually require a subdivider to build streets and sidewalks within the proposed subdivision before the subdivision plat will be approved. SALSICH, supra note 34, § 8.07.
63. Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961).
See also MANDELKER, supra note 41, § 9.17.
64. See supra note 58.
65. Most courts uphold park exactions. See, e.g., Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680
F.2d 822 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982) (requiring dedication of ten percent of land for park);
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (liberal construction of
state statute), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); J.W. Jones Companies v. City of San Diego, 203
Cal. Rptr. 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Smith v. Gwinnett County, 286 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. 1982); Krughoff v.
Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (111.1977) (contribution of land or money in lieu of land for park); Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d
888 (Wyo. 1983) (land or payment-in-lieu of land for parks and recreation); But see Berg Dev. Co. v.
Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (holding money in-lieu of land dedication invalid
as appropriation without compensation because there was no requirement that cash be used to purchase park
space or that parks be purchased near the plaintiffs subdivision).
66. SALSICH, supra note 34, § 2.09. The Jackson/Teton County Comprehensive Plan and
Land Development Regulations use exactions to acquire parks and open space. Plan, supra note
2, at 4-21; Land Development Regulations, supra note 47, at art. IV, div. 49500. See also
Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution in Washington;
Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867, 924 (1993) (Washington Growth
Management Act authorizes impact fees for publicly-owned parks, open space, and recreational
facilities.); Anne E. Mudge, Impact Fees for the Conversion of Agricultural Land: A ResourceBased Development Policy for California's Cities and Counties, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63. 64
(1992) (impact fees used to preserve agricultural lands); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government
Protection of Biodiversity: What is Its Niche, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 598-99 (1993) (impact
and in-lieu fees used in conjunction with biodiversity protection, habitat reservation, and open
space acquisition); Jennifer Gavin, Managing Growth: Tools of the Trade, DENVER POST, Oct.
26, 1994, at 22A (land dedications are a way to manage urban sprawl).
67. Justice Story said "[t]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights
of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint."
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
68. See infra note 91. But see Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 723, 727
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." ' Second, the
Takings Clause states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation." 7 o The U.S. Supreme Court has made the
Takings Clause applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,7 and the Clause has emerged as the most frequently invoked constitutional protector of private property rights.
Originally, the Takings Clause protected property owners from unlawful
governmental actions72 which amounted to "direct appropriations" or "practi(Wyo. 1985) (due process analysis intermingled with takings).
69. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See infra note 91. Chief Justice John Marshall stated: "It may
well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to
the legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an
individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation." Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Professor Rubenfeld recently presented a trenchant interpretation
of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104
YALE L.J. 1119, 1179-84 (1995).
There are other limitations on the power to exact. First, the state must have sufficient enabling
legislation. Nunziato v. Planning Bd., 541 A.2d 1105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Taub, supra note
54, at 525. In Wyoming, lack of specific enabling legislation does not automatically invalidate the imposition
of a money exaction. See, e.g., Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983) (interpreting enabling authority from the "home role" doctrine). Second, money exactions may not be a tax. Taub, supra
note 54, at 526. The distinction between a valid money exaction and a tax is subtle, and courts use different
tests to determine how the fee should be treated. Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County,
650 A.2d 712 (Md. 1994) (impact fee held an excise tax). Some consider whether its primary purpose is to
aise general revenue; if so, the fee is a tax. See, e.g., View Ridge Park Assoc, v. Mountlake Terrace, 839
P.2d 343, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). Others distinguish them based on whether the fee is paid voluntarily.
A tax is involuntary, and the "amount is not determined by any reference to the service which Ithe payorl
receives from the government." Casa Grande v. Tucker, 817 P.2d 947, 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Conversely, a money exaction is always voluntary because the payor is required to pay it only when he asks for
a building permit. Id.
71. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). However. Justice
Stevens argued in Dolan that Chicago, B. & Q. did not apply the Takings Clause to the states because
that case did not mention the Takings Clause nor the Fifth Amendment. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2327
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He cited a case decided prior to Chicago, B. & Q. which said the Takings
Clause "is a limitation on the power of the Federal government, and not on the States." Id. at 2327
n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177
(1872)). The Dolan majority did not consider the incorporation of the Takings Clause an issue and
proceeded on the premise that is applicable to the states. Id. at 2316.
Curiously, Justice Stevens has been inconsistent on this issue. In MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority: "The Fifth Amendment prohibition
applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." MacDonald, 477 U.S. 340, 342 n.1
(1986) (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236, 239, 241 (1897)). Although the Court did not conduct a full analysis in County of Yolo, Justice Stevens seemed to accept
the incorporation of the Takings Clause. Id. at 349. Similarly, in Penn Central, Justice Stevens joined
dissenting Justice Rehnquist stating that the Takings Clause applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 141 n.3 (1978) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For
unknown reasons, Justice Stevens reversed his previous positions in Dolan. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S.
Ct. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Compare eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign to appropriate private property for
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cal ousters" of land. 3 Increasing urbanization prompted local governments to
regulate property more stringently to ameliorate the problems associated with
intense population concentrations. 4 The resulting land-use regulations devalued private property, increasing landowner opposition. 5 The Framers were
well aware that property rights were profoundly important 76 but they likely
did not perceive the tension that eventually would arise between property
regulators and property owners."
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7" the Court determined that a

mere property regulation could amount to a "taking" absent a direct physical
occupation. 9 In Mahon, the Court considered whether a state statute protecting advancing urban areas from the dangers of coal mining was a valid
exercise of the police power.' In his majority opinion, Justice Oliver

a public use when it pays the landownerjust compensation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990).
73. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992) (citing Legal
Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551. 120 L. Ed. 287 (1871); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148
U.S. 92, 98-99 (1948); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879)); Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945)
(loss of water head held a taking). The Takings Clause also provided compensation in times of war.
See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871). Today, the court still recognizes a
per se rule for physical invasions. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982); but see FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (rule in Loretto is "very
narrow"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding loss of right to exclude effected by navigational servitude a taking). In addition, airplanes intruding on airspace present
interesting physical invasion-type takings cases. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946) (holding continuous Air Force overflights above chicken farm taking); Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See also generally William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985);
FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 5-104 (1973).
74. In 1922, the Court recognized that "[glovemment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
A few years later, the Court recognized, "[bluilding zone laws ... began in this country about twenty-five
years ago ... with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use
and occupation of private lands in urban communities." Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
75. Id. See also Sax, supra note 34, at 37 ("in the first quarter of this century .... the expansion of governmental regulation yielded a proliferation of claims for compensation by aggrieved
owners of private property").
76. James Madison believed property rights to be "inviolable." Property, NATIONAL GAZETIE,
March 29, 1792, reprintedin 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101, 103 (Gaillord Hunt ed., 1906).
77. Sax, supra note 34, at 54-60.
78. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
79. Id. at 413. The regulation "[admittedly] destroyled] . . . rights of property and contract.
The question [was] whether the police power can be stretched so far." Id.
80. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. Mahon indirectly addressed land-use regulation confronting
problems of urbanization. The Kohler Act prevented coal mining which would cause damage to any
nearby housing structure. Id. at 412-13. Pursuant to the Act, the Mahons enjoined Pennsylvania Coal
from mining coal under their land. Id. at 412. The Court ultimately found the regulation to devalue
the mining company's property interests to the extent that a taking had occurred. Id. at 414-15. The
Act would not have been necessary but for the expansion of urban areas to rural mining districts.
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Wendell Holmes found a taking and thereby launched the Takings Clause to
new horizons, writing: "while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."'
The "Regulatory Takings Doctrine" stems from this language, 82 and
although it is continually cited,83 no court has ever conclusively defined a
means to determine when a regulation has gone "too far."' Even Justice
Holmes recognized the limitations of his rule when he wrote: "[it] is a
question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. "' Nevertheless, the doctrine invokes the Fifth Amendment compensation requirement when a land-use regulation is so burdensome it
"takes" property akin to an actual physical ouster.' When a taking oc-

81. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. But see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987) (finding no taking with facts significantly analogous to Mahon.) In Mahon, Justice Brandeis'
dissent argued that the Kohler Act should be upheld because it merely prevented a public nuisance or a
noxious use. See, e.g., Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
82. Justice Stevens labeled the regulatory takings doctrine as "kindled [from] dictum." Dolan,
114 S. Ct. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Wy the
Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566 (1984) (the "courts have incanted his
words in what Bruce Ackerman calls a 'parody of stare decisis'"); William B. Stoebuck. Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1063 (1980).
83. For example, "[tihere is no dispute about the proposition that a regulation which goes 'too
far' must be deemed a taking." First English, 482 U.S. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
Kirkpatrick v. City of Oceanside, 283 Cal.Rptr. 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Golden Cheese Co. of
California v. Voss, 281 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Dept. of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d
993, 999 (Colo. 1994); State Dept. of Highway v. Interstate-Denver West, 791 P.2d 1119, 1121
(Colo. 1990); Meritt v. Idaho, 742 P.2d 397, 409 (Idaho 1987); Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. City of
Bridgeton, 1995 WL 46723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); McElwain v. County of Flathead, 811 P.2d 1267,
1272 (Mont. 1991); Chronis v. New Mexico ex rel. Abe Rodriguez, 670 P.2d 953, 961 (N.M. 1983);
Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Utah 1988); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 730 (Wyo. 1985).
84. It has "prove[n] to be a problem of considerable difficulty." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
123. In 1986, Justice Stevens recognized: "To this day we have no 'set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins.'" MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340, 349 (1986) (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). See also Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) ("our decision in Mahon offered little
insight into when, and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going 'too far'
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment").
85. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. The regulatory takings doctrine has elicited considerable response. See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, Clarifying the Supreme Court's Taking Cases-An Irreverent
but Otherwise Unassailable Draft Opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 DENY. U.L. REV. 325
(1994); Page Carroccia Dringman, Comment, Regulatory Takings: The Search for a Definitive Standard, 55 MONT. L. REV. 245 (1994); Glen E. Summers, Comment, PrivateProperty Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
837 (1993); Note, Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to Regulation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 914
(1993); Symposium, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1581 (1988); Rudolph, supra note 32.
86. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 31415 (1987); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (Court considered
whether a war-time regulation preventing gold mining could be a taking).
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curs, 8 the state must compensate the landowner,88 amend the regulation,
or withdraw it."

Of the land-use cases, Mahon prevails in a history of ideological meandering. Before Mahon, the Court declined to find that a mere regulation of
property violated the Takings Clause and focused on the "noxious" character
of a particular land use.'e After Mahon, the Court drifted from the Takings
Clause and became primarily concerned with Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to land-use regulations and ordinances. 9 After recognizing

87. When a landowner believes she has suffered a taking, the landowner will claim that she is
entitled to compensation through inverse condemnation. Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 369
(Iowa 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 714684, 63 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1995) (No. 94-1077)
(holding state law prohibiting disinterment of burial mound did not "take" landowners property when
landowner purchased 59 acre tract with burial mound after the state law was in effect). Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation
for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." Id. at 369-70
(citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
88. The Fifth Amendment "is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking." First English, 482 U.S. at 305. Just compensation is "a condition precedent
to the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897)
(citing Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398 (1880)). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1659 (1988)
(discussing whether the Fifth Amendment always mandates compensation).
89. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
90. Early opinions upheld economically burdensome land-use regulations that were enacted to prohibit "noxious" or "nuisance-like" activities. In 1887, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the manufacture
of alcohol which rendered the plaintiff's previously legal brewery worthless. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 668-69 (1887) ("[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense,
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit."). The Court in Lucas may have
overruled this statement by holding that a state cannot simply declare a use noxious and prohibit it, without
common law nuisance to support the prohibition. See infra notes 135-137 and accompanying text. Thirteen
years after Mugler, Justice Peckham, joined by Justice Holmes, wrote:
We are not prepared to hold that this limitation of 80 to 100 feet, while in fact a discrimination or classification, is so unreasonable that it deprives the owner of the property of its
profitable use without justification, and that he is therefore entitled under the Constitution
to compensation for such invasion of his rights. The discrimination thus made is, as we
think, reasonable, and is justified by the police power.
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909). See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(brick mill banned in residential neighborhoods); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (Plaintiff
was ordered to destroy red cedar trees that produced a disease fatal to nearby and more worthy apple
trees.). Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (holding sand and gravel mining
operation potential nuisance). The modem Court rationalizes the "noxious use" theory as "simply the
progenitor" of the contemporary rule that a land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances a legitimate state interest. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
91. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning
ordinance against due process and equal protection challenges): Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works of Los
Angeles, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) (general zoning ordinance upheld against due process and equal protection challenges): Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding set-back ordinance under equal
protection and due process challenges). In these cases, the Court refused to "substitute its judgment
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that a use restriction alone can be a taking,' the Supreme Court incorporated
due process dogma into the regulatory takings doctrine.' Recent culminations
of the doctrine exemplify this mixture.94
A. Agins v. City of Tiburon and Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York: Culminations of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine
Agins v. City of Tiburon" and its endorsement of Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York96 provide the basic takings framework leading to Dolan. In Agins, the plaintiff purchased five acres of
valuable San Francisco Bay area property with the intent to develop it
extensively.' The city subsequently re-zoned the property, allowing plaintiffs to build only five residential units.9 Upholding the ordinance against
the plaintiffs takings challenge, the Court enumerated two distinct tests
extrapolated from both due process and takings cases."
First, the Agins Court cited the 1928 due process case of Nectow v.
City of Cambridgel"o for the principle that a land-use regulation constitutes
for that of the legislative body." Zahn, 274 U.S. at 328 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395 (1926)). But see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)
(invalidating zoning ordinance based on due process).
92. Before the regulatory takings doctrine emerged from Mahon, the common challenge to
land-use restrictions was the Due Process Clause, since the Takings Clause was thought only to apply
to direct appropriations of property. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
93. Regulatory takings cases continually cite Village of Euclid thereby incorporating due process language into takings standards. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316
(1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799
F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (Cl. Ct. 1988);
Kimberlin v. City of Topeka, 710 P.2d 682 (Kan. 1985); Fort Gratiot Charter Transp. v. Kettlewell,
389 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251
(N.J. 1991). In Village of Euclid, the Court upheld a general zoning ordinance against due process
and equal protection challenges. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365. Justice Sutherland relied on
Cusack v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (regulating billboards held valid exercise of
police power). Id. at 395. In Cusack, the Court specifically rejected application of the Takings Clause
writing: "[o]bviously, claims made under the 5th amendment need not be considered . . . and there
remains only the question whether the ordinance ... would 'deprive it of its property without due
process of law.'" Cusack, 242 U.S. at 528 (citations omitted).
94. See generally Summers, supra note 85.
95. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. Id. Unanimous opinions are noticeably uncommon in recent takings cases. See, e.g, Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312
(5-4 decision); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2888 (5 in majority, 1 concurring in judgment, and 3 in dissent);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 826 (5-4 decision); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107 (6-3 decision); First English,
482 U.S. at 305 (6-3 decision).
96. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
97. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 260.
100. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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a taking if the regulation does not bear a substantial relation to a legitimate state interest.'10 Second, the Court cited Penn Central to state that a
taking also occurs when a regulation deprives the property owner of
economically viable use of his land."ta
In Penn Central, the Court upheld a landmark preservation law
against a Fifth Amendment takings claim."0 3 Penn Central enumerated the
factors to determine whether a property regulation deprives a landowner
economically viable use of his land to the point of a taking."o The Court
considered the economic impact of the regulation with particular emphasis
on the extent to which the regulation interfered with "distinct investment
backed expectations.""l The Court also considered the character of the
state action to determine whether there was an actual physical invasion
rather than "some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good."1°6
Despite these two separate tests," ° the Agins' Court still acknowledged
101. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188-89).
In Nectow, the plaintiff acquired a tract of land in a predominately industrial area pursuant to
a contract for sale. The city subsequently zoned the tract residential only. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 18687. As a result, the buyers reneged on the contract because they intended to use the land for industrial
development, which the city had prohibited. Id. The Court struck down the zoning ordinance based
on the Due Process Clause; the plaintiffs did not assert a takings claim. Id. at 185. The Nectow Court
held that the ordinance did not bear a "substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." Id. at 188 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
The Court reasoned that as applied, the ordinance would not have benefitted the inhabitants of the
tract because the land was already surrounded by existing ihdustrial development. Id. at 187.
In most instances not involving a conditional exaction, a claimant may likely have little
success arguing that a regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-86; Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. 390 (1988).
102. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
103. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. The landmark preservation law prevented the plaintiff
from building a fifty story office building over New York City's Grand Central Terminal. Id. at 11617. The plaintiffs made a series of takings challenges with respect to the air and ground space, each
of which the Court rejected. Id. at 130-39.
104. Id. at 124. Although the Court enumerated these economic factors, it also upheld the law
because the "restrictions imposed [were] substantially related tothe promotion of the general welfare." Id. at 138. The Court first identified that preserving community character was an "entirely
permissible governmental goal." Id. at 129. Secondly, the Court noted that the landmark preservation
law was an appropriate means of "securing the [state's] purposes." Id.
105. Id. at 105.
106. Id. at 124.
107. Some observers have identified Agins as a "two-pronged" or even "three part" test. They
say that the regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest and must not deny an
owner economically viable use of his land. See, e.g., Ross A. Macfarlane, Comment, Testing the
Constitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a SuperiorAlternative to
Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REv. 715. 725 (1982) (Justice Powell established a "three part test
for regulatory takings."). This interpretation is misleading. Agins provides wholly separate grounds
for establishing an unconstitutional taking. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174; Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991). InDolan.
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that "no precise rule determines when property has been taken."' 0 8 Lower
courts must weigh the private and public interests to determine whether the
public, rather than a single landowner, should shoulder an exercise of state
police power.'09 This demonstrates the fact-specific and result-oriented nature
of takings law."' When confronted with an exaction, the Court required a
more stringent interpretation of the substantial advancement requirement to
accommodate the constitutional implications of an exaction.
B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: An Exaction Must Satisfy an "Essential Nexus" to Substantially Advance a Legitimate State Interest
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, l" the Court refined
Agins' substantial advancement test because the relationship between an
exaction and a legitimate state interest is more attenuated than the relationship between traditional zoning laws and the state's interest.' i2 Earlier
cases did not define the degree of connection necessary for a land-use
regulation to substantially advance a legitimate state interest. "3 Moreover,

the plaintiffs in Nollan stood to lose their right to exclude. The Nollan
Court ruled that a conditional land exaction substantially advances a legitimate state interest if an "essential nexus" exists between the required
exaction and the state interest. 114
despite his use of the conjunctive "and," Justice Rehnquist recognized the second part of the Agins
test as a separate takings basis. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 n.6. He stated the plaintiff was "assuredly
.. able to derive some economically viable use from her property." Id. Therefore, the action would
not have been a taking under that test. Id. at 2316 n.6. Moreover, the Court in Lucas, found a taking
because South Carolina denied the land owner economically viable use, but the regulation may have
substantially advanced a legitimate state interest. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. See infra notes 126133 and accompanying text. See also Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and
JudicialReview: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part1), 23 URB. LAW. 301, 317 n.106 (1991).
108. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61.
109. Id. at 261. See also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding that
regulation cannot "forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole").
110. The Court has openly recognized its "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" in takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The denial of economically viable use cannot be
reduced to a specific standard because courts must make "ad hoc, factual inquiries." Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
111. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., White, Powell, and O'Connor, J.J. Id. Brennan, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Marshall, J. Id. at 842. Blackmun, J., filed a separate dissent. Id. at 865. Stevens, J., filed a dissent,
joined by Blackmun, J. Id. at 866.
112. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 ("there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective").
113. Previous decisions had not determined "what type of connection between the regulation
and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter." Id. at
834. The Court did acknowledge the precedents reveal that a "broad range" of interests and means
satisfy the substantially advance requirement. Id.
114. Id. at 837. Requiring a nexus "is similar to the private-law requirement that in order for

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss2/5

18

Starritt and McClanahan: Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exact
1995

COMMENT

The plaintiffs in Nollan asked the California Coastal Commission for
a permit to replace their beachfront bungalow with a larger house."' The
lot was located between two public beaches to the north and south." 6 Reviewing the Nollans' request, the Commission found that the proposed
house would increase private use of the beach and interfere with the public's ability to view the beach from a nearby road." 7 To mitigate these
harms, the Commission conditioned the Nollans' building permit on obtaining an exaction (a public easement) across the their property, bridging
the north and south beaches." 8
The Supreme Court found the exaction an uncompensated taking
because there was no "essential nexus" between the permit condition-the
exaction-and a legitimate state interest.' ' To justify the conditional
exaction the Commission argued the new house would interfere with the
public's "visual access" to the beach, in turn creating a "psychological
barrier" to physical access from the road." ° Further, the Commission
argued that providing lateral access between the two public beaches would
off set the new house's adverse impact on visual and psychological access
to the beach.'' The Court disagreed, finding no connection, or nexus, between the public's ability to walk across the Nollans' property and reducing the visual obstacles created by their new house. " The conditional
land exaction, substituted for a permit denial, "utterly fail[ed] to further
the end advanced by the justification for the prohibition."" Therefore, no

covenants to mn with the land . . they must 'touch and concern' benefitted or burdened land."
Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1766 (1988).
115. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. The Nollans had leased the bungalow but eventually wanted to
purchase it. Id. at 827. The bungalow had fallen into a state of disrepair after a number of rental
years. Id.Their option to purchase was conditioned on their demolition of the bungalow and replacing
it with a new house. Id. at 828.
116. Id. at 827.
117. Id.at 828-29. The private use claim was unsubstantiated. Id.at 828. The Commission reasoned
that if the public could not see the beach from the nearby road, they would not be as willing to use it, which
they had every right to do. Id. at 828-29. The Commission argued that this would contribute to a "'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront." Id.at 835.
118. Id. at 828.
119. Id.at 837.
120. Id. at 838. The commission offered three purposes for which it could ban development:
'protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological
barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public
beaches." Id. at 835. Justice Scalia wrote that if the Nollans' new house would substantially impede
any of these purposes, the Commission could "unquestionably" have denied the permit. Id. Justice
Scalia cautioned, however, that such a denial cannot constitute a taking as well. Id. at 835-36 (citing
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 837. The Court said "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an
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essential nexus existed between the easement exaction and visual access. 12A
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Use Restriction that
Denies All Economically Viable Use
The economic aspect of takings law may become an important consequence of Dolan's holding because Dolan may increase outright denials
of building and subdivision permits."2 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council'26 is the Supreme Court's most recent exposition of the prohibition against the denial of economically viable use."2 In Lucas, the Coastal
Council, following South Carolina's conservation legislation, prohibited
the plaintiff from building any habitable structure on his coastal property.'28 The Court held the prohibition may have been an uncompensated
taking.'29 The Court affirmed the notion that a regulation may not deprive
a landowner of all 3 economically viable use of his land without compensation. 3 ' The Court noted that regulations constraining landowners to
out-and-out plan of extortion.'" Id. (citations omitted). The Commission could have constitutionally
imposed height limitations, width restrictions, bans on fences, or even a public viewing spot on the
Nollans' property. Id. at 836.
124. Id. at 837-38. Giving the public more lateral access along the shore would presumably
have mitigated the burden on visual access created by the Nollans' new house. Id. This leap in logic
may have worked had the Court been analyzing a due process challenge to a traditional state economic or social legislation. See, e.g.. infra note 178.
125. See infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
126. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
127. The plaintiff in Lucas bought two lots in 1986 on the Isle of Palms, an island east of
Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at 2889. Plaintiff intended to build two residential houses on the lots;
but in 1988, the state enacted the Beachfront Management Act which prohibited the construction of
"occupiable improvements" on plaintiff's lots. Id. at 2889-90. The Court accepted, without argument,
that the prohibition had rendered plaintiff's property valueless. Id. at 2896 n.9.
128. Id. at 2889-90. On his own initiative, Justice Scalia queried whether preventing a landowner from building on 90% of his property is a taking of the burdened parcel or merely a diminution in
value of the whole. Id. at 2894 n.7. The Court has yet to settle Justice Scalia's query. However, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated that the Takings Clause "prohibits the uncompensated taking of private property without reference to the owner's remaining property interest."
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (1994).
129. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. The Court did not decide whether the regulation was
actually a taking because if the Coastal Council could show that some existing common-law
doctrine would prevent the plaintiffs from building on the land, no taking would occur. Id. at
2901. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that no common-law nuisance
doctrine would have prevented plaintiffs from building. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on
Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1431 (1993) ("[Tlhe Court could not conclude that a taking had
occurred."). See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
130. Justice Scalia prefaced "economically viable use" with "all" in his Lucas opinion. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2893. However, Agins did not incorporate "all" in its opinion. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260
(citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)).
131. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). But see infra note 135 (if the
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leave real property completely undeveloped elevate the risk that the property is forced into public service under the pretense of mitigating a public
harm.' 32 South Carolina, under the guise of the police power, could not
deprive a landowner of all economically viable use of his property to
conserve open space without paying compensation.'33
The Court announced that when a state regulation denies a landowner all
economically viable use of his property,' 34 the state may forego its duty to
compensate only ifthe regulation prohibits a use the state could have prohibited, given existing nuisance or property law when the landowner acquired the
property. 35 The state's bald assertion that a use is "noxious" or a "nuisance"
will not allow a prohibition of the use without compensation 36 unless it shows
37
the "noxious" use was actually a "nuisance" pursuant to prevailing law. 1

state could have prevented the use as a nuisance when the owner took title to the property, the state
could legally prevent that use without incurring compensation liability).
132. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2894-95. The Court identified other cases in which construction on
certain lands was prohibited for safety reasons, conservation of open space, and a wildlife refuge. Id.
at 2895 (citing Annicelli v. South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140-41 (R.I. 1983) and Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 193 A.2d 232, 240 (N.J. 1963)). The
Court's opinion in Lucas indicates that a building prohibition, under the guise of safety, would not be
regarded favorably because a state should use its power of eminent domain instead. Id.
133. Id. See infra note 134 (equivalence to a physical ouster).
134. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. This is a "categorical rule." Id. A regulation depriving an
owner all economically viable use is similar to a physical ouster from the property. Id. at 2894. The
Court said: "Where 'permanent physical occupation' of land is concerned, we have refused to allow
the government [to escape the compensation requirement] no matter how weighty the asserted 'public
interests' . . . We believe similar treatment must be accorded ... regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land." Id. at2900.
135. Id. at 2899 (Takings jurisprudence is traditionally guided by the understandings of "our
citizens" regarding governmental power over their property "when they obtain title to property.").
See also Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 87 (1992). ("[Lucas] fixes the date on which the
claimant acquires his interest for determining whether he possesses a compensable property interest").
In Lucas, The Court remanded the case with the following admonition to the South Carolina courts:
We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest ...As
we have said, a 'State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation. Instead .... South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02 (citation omitted). In other words, a state may not summarily declare a certain
use of property to be a nuisance and escape the compensation requirement if the prohibition of that use deprives a landowner all economically viable use of his land. See also Sax, supra note 31, at 1438 ("Established common law 'principles' of nuisance and property law are not affected."). For detailed discussions of
Lucas, see Symposium, Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Commission: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993). See supra note 90, for cases using the noxious use theory.
136. C. Preseault,27 Fed. Cl. at 90 (mere assertion of "general regulatory authority" insufficient).
The Lucas Court may have pillaged the legislative function by "elevat[ing] the common law of nuisance-and the judges who define it-to a new ascendancy over legislatures' traditional land use authority."
John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial
Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATHt. U.L. REV. 771, 773 (1993).
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In summary, the Court has identified distinct classes of takings
contemplated by the Fifth Amendment. First, there are cases that
involve a direct physical invasion of property. In these cases, no
amount of governmental interest will relieve the state of its obligation
to compensate for the taking.' 38 Second, there are the purely regulatory
cases, which Mahon engendered and Lucas exalts. 3 9 Here, the Court
focuses on the regulation's economic ramifications on the landowner
because these cases involve regulations that devalue property."1 Third,
Nollan represents a hybrid class of cases in which the regulation, an
exaction, produces a partial physical occupation; but if the exaction
substantially advances a legitimate state interest, the Court will not require compensation.' 4' Nollan held that a conditional land exaction
must bear an essential nexus to a legitimate state end. In Dolan, the
Court defined the necessary degree of relationship needed to satisfy the
essential nexus, the hiatus Nollan left unfilled. 42

137. The Court said, "the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the
basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated."
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. The Court stressed that a "decree eliminating all economically beneficial
uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses." Id. at 2902 n.18. But see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926) (orthodox validity of zoning ordinance analogous to validity of state police
power to abate a nuisance). See also John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the
Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).
138. See supra note 73. In Lucas, the Court said, "no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation." Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2893 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
139. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94 (holding coastal protection statue possibly a taking); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictics, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (mining regulation held not a
taking); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (landmark preservation statute held not a taking); Mahon, 260
U.S. at 415-16 (mining regulation held taking); Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1178, cert. denied, 502
U.S. 952 (1991) (prohibition of coal mining on alluvial valley held a taking).
The Court also has recognized "temporary" takings as another distinct class. See, e.g., First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) ("no
subsequent action by government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective"). But see Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63, 263 n.9 (no temporary
taking on facts).
140. See supra note 139, Sax, supra note 34, at 50-60; Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of
Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?. 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984).
141. Conditional land exactions resemble physical appropriations of land because a landowner
loses the right to exclude. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833; Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316. However, when
challenged as a taking, the Court analyzes conditional land exactions as regulatory takings because the
appropriation arises only upon the landowner's application for a development permit. See, e.g.,
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-34. See also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1607-09 (1988).
142. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
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D. Dolan v. City of Tigard: An Essential Nexus Must Be Roughly
Proportional
Tigard, a suburb of Portland, Oregon, completed a comprehensive
land-use plan pursuant to a long-standing Oregon state mandate and revised its Community Development Code to implement the plan. 43 As
revised, a developer could obtain a building permit within the Fanno
Creek 100-year floodplain only if he agreed to donate land for a public
greenway and a bicycle/pedestrian path.'"
The Dolans"'5 own a lot in downtown Tigard where they operated a
retail plumbing store." 6 Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern
corner of their property and along the western boundary." 7 The Dolans
applied for a building permit to raze their existing plumbing store, construct a larger one, and pave the parking lot."48 Acting pursuant to its
development code, Tigard's Planning Commission granted the Dolans'
permit on the condition that they "deed" land located within the 100-year
Fanno Creek floodplain for a public greenway and bike/pedestrian path."49
The Dolans sought a variance from the conditional exaction, but the
Commission denied the request. 50
The Dolans appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA),
asserting that Tigard's exaction constituted an uncompensated taking.'

143. Id.at 2313. See also ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005 to -. 860 (1991). The plan dictated that
the City should "develop a vegetative buffer along streams and drainageways." Petitioner's Brief at 5.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518). The city later completed a transportation study that identified traffic congestion as a particular problem. In order to combat this, the City
developed a plan for a pedestrian/bicycle path to encourage alternate modes of transportation for short
trips. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
144. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
145. Florence Dolan's husband, John T. Dolan, died during the pendency of their action against
the City of Tigard. Petitioner's Brief at 7 n. 1, Dolan (No. 93-518).
146. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2313. The store covered about 9,700 square feet of a 1.67 acre parcel of land. Id.
The Dolans wanted to increase its size from 9,700 square feet to 17,600 square feet and pave a 39space parking lot. Id. Eventually, they also wanted to construct another building and provide more
parking space on the parcel. Id. at 2313-14.
149. Id. at 2314. Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Dolans' argument that Tigard had requested
a fee simple interest in their property. Id.at 2316; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 7, Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (No. 93-518). Tigard argued that the requirement was an easement. Respondent's Brief at 18 n. 16, Dolan (No. 93-518). Tigard said the fee-tide for street easements remained in
the grantor and reverted to the grantor if the street were ever abandoned. Id. Justice Rehnquist was
particularly concerned with the Dolans' loss of their right to exclude others from the dedicated portion of the property. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
150. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
151. Id. at 2315.
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The Land Use Board of Appeals rejected the claim and found a "reasonable relationship between the [impact of the] proposed development
and the requirement to dedicate land along Fanno Creek for a
greenway."'5 According to the Board, the proposed development
indisputably would increase runoff into Fanno Creek. 153 The Board
also found a reasonable relationship between requiring the
bike/pedestrian path exaction and the abatement of traffic congestion
because the path "could" provide alternate modes of transportation. 154
Essentially, the bike/pedestrian path was a sidewalk.
Both the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed LUBA's decision and upheld the exaction.' Each court re56
jected the Dolans' argument that Nollan required heightened scrutiny"
of conditional land exactions. " The Oregon Supreme Court interpreted Nollan to rule that an "exaction is reasonably related to an impact if
the exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit would
serve."s' The court found that Tigard's "unchallenged factual findings" supported the conditional exaction, and that the exaction would
serve the same purpose as an outright denial. 159
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's
decision and ruled in the Dolans' favor."6 Writing for five Justices, Chief
Justice Rehnquist held that when Tigard made an adjudicative decision to
condition the Dolans' building permit on a land exaction, Tigard had to
justify its decision by making an individualized determination that the na-

152. Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, LUBA 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at2322.

155. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), and Dolan v. City of Tigard,
854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), respectively.

156. Many commentators have argued that Nollan elevated the level of judicial scrutiny. See.
e.g., Michelman, supra note 141, at 1605-14, 1607 ("the Court [in Nollan] expressly endorsed a
form of semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny") But see Note, Municipal Development Exactions,
the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 1012 (1989) (ex-

plaining that the "hint" of closer scrutiny in Nollan "should remain the sensible supplement to per se
takings doctrine that its facts suggest it is").
157.

Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.

158. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 443.
159. Id. The court deferred to Tigard's findings that "[c]reation of a convenient, safe
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system . . could offset some of the traffic demand on these nearby
streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See infra notes 175-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of the how Dolan shifts the burden of proof to the city, thereby rendering it impossible for a city to rely on unchallenged fact
findings to support a land-use exaction.
160. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the

Chief Justice's majority opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion which Justices Blackmun
and Ginsburg joined. Justice Souter filed a separate dissent. Id. at 2312.
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ture and extent of the exaction was roughly proportional to the anticipated
impacts of the Dolans' proposed development. 16 '
Because Tigard failed to make this showing, the Court found the exaction was an unconstitutional taking.162 Tigard required the dedication of a
public greenway within Fanno Creek's floodplain, but failed to show why a
public greenway was roughly proportional to reducing flood problems created
by the Dolans' proposed development.' 63 Tigard also failed to demonstrate
that a bike/pedestrian path "would" mitigate the increased downtown traffic
congestion created by the Dolans' development." 6 Tigard's finding that a
bike/pedestrian path "could" offset "some" of the traffic and mitigate the
Dolans' impact on traffic congestion did not satisfy rough proportionality. 65
To reach its holding, the Court endorsed Nollan's extension of the
substantial advancement test-the essential nexus." 6 Beyond this precept,
the Court coined "rough proportionality" as the logical progeny of the essential nexus.' 67 Justice Rehnquist accomplished this by considering "representative" state70court decisions." 6 The Court rejected the "lax"' 69 and
"very exacting"' approaches and embraced the intermediate approach
used by a majority of state courts. 7' These "intermediate" courts typically
used the words "reasonable relationship" to describe their required degree
of connection between an exaction and achieving a state end.72 However,
Justice Rehnquist chose the words "rough proportionality" instead because he felt those words best described the proper relationship under
federal law. 17 The majority carefully chose a term that did not suggest a
it wanted a standard that would
lower level of judicial review because
74
sufficiently protect private property. 1
161. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at2319-20.

162. Id. at 2322.
163. Id. at 2322-23.
164. Id. at 2321.
165. Id. at 2321-22.
166. Id. at 2317 ("we must first determine whether the 'essential nexus' exists").
167. Id. at 2317, 2319-20.
168. Id. at 2318-19. The Court did this because the states had been considering the constitutionality of land-use exactions long before the Supreme Court. Id. In dissent, however, Justice
Stevens argued these cases "either fail to support or decidedly undermine the Court's conclusions in
key respects." Id. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2318-19 (citing Billings Properties, Inc., v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182
(Mont. 1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966)).
170. Id. at 2319 (citing Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
1961) ("specific and uniquely attributable test")).
802 (111.
171.

Id. (citing Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)).

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. Justice Rehnquist was careful not to adopt language that might denote the rational or
reasonable relationship test used to analyze equal protection claims. Id.
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Judicial review of legislative enactments has been accepted since
Marbury v. Madison. 75 However, it is axiomatic that a court will not
substitute its judgment for the legislature's when reviewing economic and
social legislation.'
Without question, "facts supporting the legislative
judgment [are] presumed."'" Economic and social legislation need only
be supported by some rational basis,' and legislative acts are presumptively constitutional.' 79 Accordingly, a challenger bears the burden to
prove a statute is unconstitutional."S
Similarly, courts historically have reviewed land-use regulations
using a rational standard of review'8 ' and honored them with the traditional presumption of validity." 2 The challenger consequently bears the burden of proof."8 However, legislative agencies that "adjudicate" must
present fact findings so a reviewing court can determine whether their
decisions are supported by substantial evidence." s Nevertheless, the typi175. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
176. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S 144, 152 (1938).
177. Id.
178. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("It is enough that there is
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was
a rational way to correct it.").
179. Economic and social legislation not involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights
carries a strong presumption of validity that cannot be overcome absent a clear showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981).
180. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S 251, 258 (1931) (Brandeis, J.).
Justice Blackmun recognized the importance of deferring to the legislature in Lucas. Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("the State now has the burden of showing the regulation is not
a taking"). See also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893) (the judiciary must respect legislative acts).
181. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning classified as economic-social legislation needed to bear only "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective")
(citation omitted); Associated Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, (Cal.
1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n of
Glastonbury, 563 A.2d 1339, 1345 (Conn. 1989); Billings Properties, Inc., v. Yellowstone County,
394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966); Bird v. Colorado Springs, 489 P.2d 324, 325-26 (Colo. 1971) ("include every intendment in favor of its validity").
See also Michelman, supra note 141, at 1607 ("minimal test of plausibility").
182. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("the usual presumption of
constitutionality"); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (legislative judgment is "well-nigh
conclusive"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the validity ... be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."). See also Humbach,
supra note 137, at 23-28.
183. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
(holding that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to prove the statute constitutes a taking).
184. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) (1966). Rather than assuming the existence of facts to support an adjudicative decision,
like the assumption regarding legislative determinations, adjudicators are held to higher evidentiary
burdens. They must support their decisions with substantial evidence in the record. Universal Camera
Corp, 340 U.S at 488. See also Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumptionof
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cal substantial evidence standard permits considerable deference to the
adjudicator, and a reviewing court will not overturn the decision unless
there is less than a "scintilla" of supporting evidence.l"
Confronted with an exaction, the Supreme Court in Dolan essentially
adopted a substantial evidence-type standard, although more demanding,
by shifting the burden of proof to the city. It did so because Tigard had
"adjudicated." In the following discussion, the authors demonstrate the
analytical flaws in Dolan's holding and illustrate its practical effects. The
authors also assess Dolan's applicability to pre-annexation agreements and
money exactions.
DISCUSSION

L Adjudication: The Analytical Justificationfor Shifting the Burden
Justice Rehnquist twice stated that Tigard had made an adjudicative decision to grant the Dolans' permit conditioned on a land exaction.' 86 He held that in such a situation, the city has the burden to
justify its decision. 1' However, Justice Rehnquist did not explain his

Constitutionalityin Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 8 (1992) ("Legislative bodies are not subject to
the same evidentiary burdens as fact finders.").
185. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 477.
186. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320 n.8. Justice Rehnquist possibly did this to disguise the
resulting scrutiny of legislative determinations. Justice Stevens argued the majority had reverted to an
era when "[m]embers of [the] Court" invalidated state economic regulations they viewed as "unwise
or unfair." Id. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Nollan Court may have first signified a shift in
the burden. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. It was not until 1994 that the Court expressly did so.
Dolan, 114. S. Ct. at 2319-2320. 2320 n.8.
187. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320 n.8. Justice Rehnquist's justification for shifting the burden
raises issues regarding separation of powers. That doctrine dictates that each branch of government "[should]
confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power.... must be resisted." Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); O'Donogue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (the
acts of each branch shall never be subject to the "coercive influence of either of the other deparments"). In
this respect, the judicial branch should check the legislative branch, but not usurp a legislative power.
O'Donogue, 289 U.S. at 530. See also McRay v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 54 (1904) (the judiciary shall
not usurp power of the legislature); Board of Sup'rs of Fairfax County v. Allman, 211 S.E.2d 48, 55 (Va.
1975) (court should not to substitute its judgment for the legislature regarding general zoning classification).
Even Justice Scalia expresses conviction for the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2882 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Dolan shifted the burden to justify a
land dedication to the local legislature. The Court justified the burden shift because it thought Tigard had
made an adjudicative decision to condition the Dolans' permit on an exaction. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316,
2320 n.8. If Tigard's action were adjudicative, the Court would not have usurped the Town's legislative
authority, since the Court and the Town each would have acted as adjudicators. In that instance, the Court
could justify higher scrutiny. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Brevard v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.
1993) (adjudication justifies higher scrutiny). However, the distinction between legislation and adjudication
can be minimal and when it is, the justification for shifting the burden fails.
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conclusion that Tigard's decision was adjudicative.' 88 His conclusion is
only partially correct, making the rationale for shifting the burden
vulnerable to criticism.
The distinction between legislation and adjudication can be slight,
making certain aspects of Tigard's decision arguably adjudicative and
others arguably legislative."t9 By strict definition, legislation formulates
general rules or policy, and adjudication applies rule or policy to specific
facts." g Discretionary interpretation of statutory mandates figures prominently in a court's determination that an act is adjudicative.'"'
Tigard's decision to condition the Dolans' building permit on their
grant of the bike/pedestrian path is theoretically adjudication. Under the
Community Development Code, the City Planning Commission had some
discretion, albeit minimal, to determine the means to facilitate the path
and decrease traffic congestion.'9' The Commission could condition the
permit on a land exaction if the proposed development were physically
linkable to an existing path. 93 Alternatively, if the development were not
linkable, the City could allocate part of the path's construction cost to the
developer by requiring an impact fee. 94 Based on each development's
circumstances, the Commission could choose between a land exaction and

188. Some may posit that Tigard had made an adjudicative decision when the Dolans applied for
a variance from the conditions imposed. However, if this is the case, Justice Rehnquist did not make
this clear. He merely stated "the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320 n.8.
189. Carolyn M. Van Noy, Comment, The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A Conflict in
Values, 61 WASH. L. REV. 533, 540 (1986) (stating the line 'is often hard to recognize").
190. See generally Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908); Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Cherry Hills Resort v. Cherry Hills Village,
757 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1988); Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Brevard v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.
1993); Michael M. Shultz & Jeffrey B. Groy, The Failure of Subdivision Control in the Western
United States: A Blueprintfor Local Government Action, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 569, 610-613 (1988);
Van Noy, supra note 189, at 538-40.
191. Home Builders Assoc. of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, No. 1 CA-CV 92-0210,
1995 WL 61490, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Dolan was inapplicable to impact fee
when town, acting pursuant to legislative mandate, lacked discretionary interpretation necessary for
adjudication). See also Van Noy, supra note 189.
192. Tigard's Code states:
The development shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circulation if the site is located on a
street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated greenway/open space/park.
Specific items to be addressed [include]: (i) Provision of efficient, convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation systems, linking developments by requiring
dedication and construction of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the comprehensive
plan. If direct connection cannot be made, require that funds in the amount of the construction cost be deposited into an account for the purpose of constructing paths.
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313 n.1 (citing CDC § 18.86.040.A.l.b.).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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an impact fee, giving the City some discretion to tailor an exaction to a
particular set of facts.
On the other hand, the City's action is less discretionary and therefore, less adjudicative, regarding the floodplain/open space requirement.' 9 5 Tigard's Development Code dictates that any development within
the Fanno Creek floodplain "shall" dedicate land within the floodplain for
a public greenway."'9 According to the Code, the Commission must determine only whether the subject property lies within the floodplain. If so,
the Commission had no alternative other than to require the land exaction."9 Because the floodplain requirement is virtually self-executing and
non-discretionary, Tigard's decision requires no interpretation and
amounts merely to enforcing a legislative mandate.
Justice Rehnquist further justified shifting the burden of proof to the
town by distinguishing Dolan from precedent cases in which towns had
legislatively zoned entire areas. 9 ' In these cases, the challenging party
had the burden to show that a town had arbitrarily regulated property
rights."

But in Dolan, the majority shifted this burden because it felt

Tigard acted on the Dolans' individual parcel of land. The Dolans' parcel,
however, was part of a larger class-the Fanno Creek floodplain. Tigard
had legislatively classified the entire Fanno Creek area so each developer
along the Creek had to provide an exaction within the floodplain.' Under
the Development Code mandate, Tigard treated each developer uniformly.20 1 If the developer had land within the floodplain, Tigard invariably
required a land exaction for the greenway. The majority's reasoning in
Dolan is suspect because Tigard had indeed classified an entire area,
precisely like a general zoning classification. 202
Legislative acts are entitled to a presumption of validity; 2 3 therefore,
courts should be loathe to declare them unconstitutional.' ° Moreover,
195. Id. at 2331 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter thought the adjudication occurred
when the Dolan's requested a variance from the permit conditions, not the decision to condition permit since Tigard's Development Code required such a condition. Id. The degree of discretion is a
factor of adjudication. See Van Noy, supra note 189, at 538.
196. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. However, the city did have some amount of discretion to determine precisely how much land within the greenway should be exacted. Id.
197. Id.
198. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320 n.8.
199. Id. at 2320 n.8. The Court referred to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980). Id. at 2316.
200. Id. at 2314. Before Dolan, a town did not have to consider individual impacts.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2316, 2320 n.8.
203. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
204. In Dolan, Justice Stevens argued, "the Court has made a serious error by abandoning the tradi-
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when the level of adjudication amounts only to non-discretionary statutory
enforcement, the burden of proof does not properly rest with the legislature. Regardless of the analytical justification for shifting the burden,
Dolan presents significant practical obstacles for Rocky Mountain towns
using land exactions to conserve open space.
HI.

The PracticalEffect of Dolan's IndividualizedDeterminationof Rough

Proportionality:Conditional Open Space Exactions Are More Difficult to
Justify

Dolan adds "rough proportionality" as a new and controversial
component of the regulatory takings doctrine. 5 Although some check
is necessary to prevent a town from requiring a more extensive exaction than actually needed to mitigate development impacts, 2°6 rough
proportionality imposes burdensome obstacles for Rocky Mountain
town planners using land exactions to obtain open space from builders
and subdividers. The following examples demonstrate that the findings
Dolan requires may be particularly difficult to demonstrate.

tional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an
admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Justice Stevens said rough proportionality "rnits] contrary to the traditional treatment of these
cases and break[s] considerable and unpropitious new ground." Id. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although the majority specifically said mathematical precision is not necessary, it is easy to
demonstrate rough proportionality using a mathematical formula. For example, suppose a city demonstrates, after diligent research and consultation with land-use experts, that one acre of land adjacent to
a creek is necessary to absorb 2000 gallons of storm water run-off which is a legitimate state interest.
Now comes a developer who wants to build a structure that will increase water run-off by 7000 gallons. In a purely mathematical sense, rough proportionality would require a 3.5 acre exaction of
pervious open space: 7000 gal./x acre exaction = 2000 gal./l acre.
206. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2319. The rationales espoused in Dolan have long been recognized. In
1958, Professor Dunham offered the following foresight:
It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit his land to park use in order to
meet the public desire for a park, but an owner may be compelled to furnish a portion
of his land for park where the need for a park results primarily from activity on other
land of the owner. It is unconstitutional to compel him to use his land as a parking lot
in order to obtain a parking lot for the community, but it is within constitutional
power to compel an owner to provide a parking lot for the parking needs of activities
on his own land.
Allison Dunham. A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning (Making Room for Robert Mosaes,
William Zeckendor, and a City Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 666-67
(1958). Professor Rubenfeld posits a similar "using" theory. Under this theory, a regulation "effectively forces a piece of property into state-dictated service, it must pay." E.g. Rubenfeld, supra note
70, at 1182.
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A. Jackson's Flat Creek Exaction: The Findings Necessary to Meet
Nollan's Essential Nexus and Dolan's Rough Proportionality
The Town of Jackson, Wyoming, utilizes land exactions to preserve
open space. 7 Jackson requires new subdivisions along Flat Creek to
donate a ten-foot public fishing easement along the stream bank.2 "8 The
easement is intended to restore the stream environmentally and provide
public recreation. 2°9 Understandably, Jackson recognizes that a "restored
and accessible Flat Creek
would be a visual and recreational amenity to
210
the entire community."
Before considering Dolan, the Flat Creek exaction must satisfy
Nollan's essential nexus test."' However, Dolan did not indicate
whether the landowner or the town bears the burden of establishing an
essential nexus. Justice Rehnquist discussed the burden shift only after
reaching the nexus and proportionality questions.2 " Arguably, Dolan
requires a town to bear the burden of proving an essential nexus. In
Dolan, the Court justified the burden shift because Tigard had adjudicated, and the Dolans relinquished their right to exclude. Both circumstances were present in Nollan. Given these circumstances, Dolan
shifts the burden to prove an exaction's constitutionality to the town.
Therefore, a town now may have the burden to prove both an essential
nexus and rough proportionality. However, since Dolan was silent on
the issue, the landowner still should bear the burden to show that an
essential nexus is non-existent. 1 3 If the landowner proves that no
nexus exists, the inquiry will end. But if a nexus does exist, the burden shifts to the town for the extra demonstration of rough proportionality.
Regardless of who bears the burden, an essential nexus entails two
factors. First, the town must have the ability to deny or limit the subdivi207. The "residents expressed a strong desire to retain a rural western character and a sense of
true community .. . .They were committed to preserving open space." Plan, supra note 2,at 1-3.
208. Land Development Regulations, supra note 47, at art. IV,div. 49500(D).
209. Flat Creek is a pristine trout stream in areas north of Town. However, the Jackson/Teton County
Comprehensive Plan identifies Flat Creek in Town as the "single most prominent natural feature in need of
immediate attention." Plan, supra note 2, at 4-19. The Plan recommends immediate restoration by designatingthe stream as a "special enhancement area" and further suggests that public access be provided by the
use of "exactions, or as conditions of record." Plan, supra note 2, at 4-19, 21.
210. Plan, supra note 2, at 4-19.
211. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 ("If we find a nexus exists, we must then decide the required
degree of connection between the exaction and the projected impact of the proposed development.").

212. Id. at 2319, 2320 n.8.
213.

McElwain v. County of Flathead, 811 P.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Mont. 1991) (presuming set-

back ordinance valid and landowner has the burden).
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sion permit to achieve its goals.2" Second, the conditional exaction, substituted for the greater power to deny, must further the same state end
advanced as the justification for the denial.2"5 Thus, pursuant to its police
power, Jackson must be able to deny development within ten feet of Flat
Creek to achieve stream restoration and recreation.2" 6
Denying a subdivision permit would limit the number of new residents using existing recreational facilities and help restore the Creek's
environmental integrity. Likewise, the Flat Creek exaction excludes building and provides needed recreational accommodations. It substantially advances Jackson's legitimate interest in promoting convenient public recreation. Imposed as a condition to subdivide along the Creek, the exaction
achieves the same result as a subdivision permit denial. Therefore, it
likely satisfies an essential nexus. However, Dolan requires a closer inspection of the exaction.
Dolan commands courts to consider whether the "nature and extent" of

an exaction are "roughly proportional" to the impact of new development.2" 7
Manifest from the opinion, a court must examine the impact of new development on a preventable harm, or assess how, and to what extent, new development creates the need for a public accommodation.2"' The majority's application of rough proportionality does not reveal the logistics of such a relationship.2" 9 Presumably, a court must examine the size, location, and ownership of an exaction to determine whether its nature and extent are roughly
proportional to the anticipated impact from proposed development.'

214. Both the Nollan and Dolan Courts proceeded on the premise that the respective land-use
governing bodies could have denied the landowners' building permits to achieve their goals. Nollan,
483 U.S. at 836; Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2318 ("(ilt seems ...obvious that a nexus exists ....").Of
course, the denial cannot deprive the landowner economically viable use of his land. See generally
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 and infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
215. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
216. The "ability to deny" the permit contemplates only the Town's inherent ability to issue a
denial pursuant to its police power. The ability to deny does not contemplate whether the Town could
deny the permit without incurring takings liability. In Notion, the Court assumed, for argument, that
the Coastal Commission could have denied the Nollans' building permit entirely to preserve the
public's view of the beach. Nollan, 482 U.S. at 836. The Court noted that such a denial could not deprive the Nollans economically viable use of their property without being a taking. Id.
217. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
218. In Nollan and Dolan, each plaintiffs proposed development adversely impacted a constitutionally preventable harm. In Dolan, the proposed plumbing store would impact, to some extent,
Tigard's interest in controlling flooding and mitigating downtown traffic congestion. Dolan, 114 S.
Ct. at 2313. In Nollan, the plaintiffs' new house would prevent the public from viewing the public
beaches. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
219. Justice Souter argued that the majority did not apply its new test of rough proportionality
dissenting).
to the facts. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2330 (Souter, J.,
220. In Dolan, the land dedication was public, next to a creek, and roughly seven thousand
square feet. Id. at 2314.
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Regarding its nature and extent, the Flat Creek easement is ten feet
wide, publicly owned, economically burdensome to landowners, 21 and
potentially located in residential neighborhoods. 22 Because the easement
is public, the landowners along the Creek will lose their right to exclude,
like the plaintiffs in Dolan.2' In Dolan, the Court observed that Tigard
"never said why a public greenway, opposed to a private one, was required." 4 Similarly, to meet rough proportionality, Jackson will need to
show why a public easement, opposed to a use restriction, is roughly
proportional to the impact created by new subdivisions.' A use restriction that preserves the landowners' right to exclude protects the stream
bank as effectively as a public easement and may even provide more protection for the stream. 6 However, one of Jackson's asserted purposes is
public recreation-unlike Tigard, whose only goal for the greenway was
flood control. A public easement along Flat Creek allows public recreation and promotes Jackson's interest in providing for it.
It seems the Town wishes to create a public right to fish along the
Creek by having adjacent landowners foot the bill.' The Town can argue
that new subdivisions bring more people, many of whom will pursue the
popular Jackson pastime of trout fishing. Additionally, new subdivision
residents create the need for more parks and recreation because they
increase the use of existing recreational spots. 8 But, Dolan may prevent
the Town from legislatively declaring that a ten-foot exaction is appropriate for every subdivision along the Creek. Instead, Dolan contemplates
221. Land in Teton County is very valuable, especially riparian to a scenic trout stream. See
supra note 6.
222. Flat Creek flows through both commercial and residential districts. In Dolan, Tigard unsuccessfully argued the that the plaintiffs' "commercial" land should not enjoy the same degree of
protection as the Court accorded the residential landowner in Nollan. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321. A
residential landowner may be able to assert this argument with more success. Cf. United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) ("special safeguards to the privacy of the home").
223. The right to exclude is a fundamental component of property. Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2320
(citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176).
224. Id.
225. The Town could ban development within ten feet of the stream bank but allow the
landowner to retain his right of exclusion. But see infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., R. Prescott Jaunich, The Environment, The Free Market, and Properly Rights:
Post-Lucas Privatizationof the Public Trust, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 167, 192-93 (1994).
227. Jackson may face further problems because the Town desires to create an easement for
which the public has no legal right. Because Wyoming law confers no public right so fish from a
stream bank, the town may have considerable difficulty arguing that new development impacts a right
that does not exist. See, e.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145-46 (Wyo.1961) (holding state
ownership of the water bestows the right to float on the surface allowing only incidental touching of
the shore and bed). Compare Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29 (Court specifically identified public right to
walk along and view the beach).
228. National Geographic recently recognized the increased burdens on recreation in the Grand
Teton National Park area. Brian Hodgson, Grand Teton, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1995, at 119.
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that each subdivision may oblige more or less land depending on how
much space is necessary for a given number of anglers brought in by each
subdivision. 9 Jackson will have to demonstrate "exactly" how much land
will mitigate the burdens created by new recreation-seeking residents.
Therefore, the town may be able to justify only five feet when a subdivision brings in only fifty residents, and if a subdivision attracts one hundred residents, the city perhaps could justify a ten-foot easement.2 0 To
make the showing, expensive "rough proportionality experts" may become a necessary routine."
B. The Meaning of Individualized Determination
A town must make an "individualized determination" to demonstrate
that an exaction is roughly proportional to the impact created by a devel-

opment.*32 In Dolan, the bike/pedestrian path may have been objectively
desirable, but the Court required Tigard to quantify the extent to which
the Dolans' individual development created or contributed to the need for
the path. Next, Tigard had to show the bike/pedestrian path actually
would mitigate the increased traffic congestion.233
A hypothetical 4 demonstrates the potential ramifications of the
individualized determination requirement. Suppose a developer applies to
the fictitious town of "Big Whiskey, '"" Wyoming, for a subdivision per229. The allowable width of the easement would depend on findings that show how much land
is required for a certain number of people to stand on the bank and fish. In Dolan, Tigard did not
demonstrate that the "additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by [plaintiffs] development [is roughly proportional] to the ... requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
230. These numbers are purely arbitrary, for the sake of example only. The appropriate width
will depend on sufficient findings. Id. at 2319-20.
231. The city might pass the cost to the developer. Interview with Gilbert F. McNeish, Partner,
Grimshaw & Harring, P.C., Professor Adjunct, Planning Law, School of Architecture and Planning,
University of Colo. at Denver, in Denver, Colo. (Jan. 26, 1995). The Jackson plan specifically allocates the cost of determining the appropriate amount of a fee-in-lieu to the developer. See, e.g., Land
Development Regulations, supra note 47, at art. IV, div. 49500(B).
232. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20. The Court foreshadowed this requirement in Nollan when
Justice Scalia recapitulated that it is unfair to require individuals to pay for public improvements when
they did not contribute proportionally to the need for those improvements. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835
n.4. This is not a new concept in takings law. Justice Holmes, the progenitor of the regulatory takings
doctrine, bolstered his opinion with the tenet that "the question at the bottom is upon whom the loss
of the changes desired should fall." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
233. In Dolan, the majority required a showing that the bike path exaction "would mitigate traffic."
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22. A finding that the path "could mitigate traffic" was insufficient. Id.
234. The authors recognize the examples utilized throughout this comment are not precisely
analogous to Dolan's facts. By way of example, the authors hope to demonstrate how Dolan may
apply to open-space dedications in the Rocky Mountain West.
235. The residents of Big Whiskey hope that impending growth will not be "unforgiving" to
their pastoral village.
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mit. He wants to subdivide his 640-acre ranch, which his family homesteaded in 1890. The ranch is located on a wildlife corridor that Big Whiskey's land-use plan has designated for conservation.236 The developer is
particularly interested in constructing about twenty-five modest ranchettes
on or near the corridor so new homeowners can view the abundant elk
and deer each morning over coffee. But the ranch owner's neighbors
already had developed nearby fifteen years earlier. As a result, this
developer's land is the last remaining route to a critical water source.
To protect the migrating animals, Big Whiskey could grant the permit
contingent on an open-space exaction within the wildlife corridor." In
which case, Big Whiskey will have to make an individualized determination of rough proportionality pursuant to Dolan. 9
There are two polar interpretations of the individualized determination.
At the first extreme, advanced by property rights advocates, Big Whiskey
would have to consider the individual developer's historic impact on the
wildlife corridor and tailor its exaction accordingly. 2' At the other extreme,
the town need only assess the individual impact of a developer's proposal,
together with the cumulative impact of his neighbors,24 and devise its exaction given the circumstances existing at the time of the application.

236. Allowing wildlife to migrate "is a preservation technique that is compatible only with wide
spaces or plentiful resources, where plants and animals have an opportunity to regenerate in a condition of non-use . . . If we want wildlife, we need to retain some portion of more or less wild habitat,
even though the outlying areas are devoted to other uses." Carol A. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVrL. L. 1, 17 (1994).
237. Many Rocky Mountain towns lie near critical wildlife habitats where urban sprawl is particularly
devastating. It is not uncommon for homes (or proposed development) to be located on critical migration
and winter habitats for moose, elk, or deer. See generally Craig A. Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN.
ENVrL. L.J. 1 (1991); George C. Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433 (1982).
238. Big Whiskey could also choose to deny the permit all together which would raise takings
considerations under Lucas. See infra notes 250-57. In addition, Big Whiskey could condition the
permit on obtaining an impact fee. See infra notes 296-308 and accompanying text for a discussion of
whether Dolan applies to impact fees.
Further, the Town could grant the permit contingent on allowing the developer to build only
outside of the corridor leaving perhaps eighty percent of his land undeveloped. This situation raises
the particular issue which Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan did not address: the Court has yet to consider
whether the ban on developing only a portion of one's property constitutes a "partial" taking. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. See supra note 128. Of course, the Town could also condemn the land and
pay compensation.
239. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
240. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Dushku, Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation, to Editorial Board
of the Land and Water Law Review 7 (Oct. 4, 1994) (on file with the Land and Water Law Review). This
interpretation is arguably incorrect because it ignores the language of Dolan's holding that an exaction must
be roughly proportional to the impact of proposed development. See infra notes 246-248.
241. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 (the town can consider the developer alone or in conjunction with
other construction).
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The developer likely will argue for the first interpretation because his
land has remained undeveloped for over a hundred years. He is not responsible for the pre-existing shortage of migratory routes. Precedents, including
Dolan, may provide theoretical support for his argument.342 In Nollan, the
Court noted in dicta that the Coastal Commission could not single out landowners to "remedy [a] problem[] although they had not contributed to it
more than other . . . landowners.""U3 Similarly, according to the Dolan
majority, a "principal purpose" of the Takings Clause is to ensure that a
town does not force a single landowner to shoulder the costs of public improvements which should be borne by the public.'4 An individualized determination under this reasoning could mean that Big Whiskey must realize that
a burden exists on the wildlife corridor for which this developer is not "individually" responsible. Therefore, if Big Whiskey singles out the developer to
remedy the animal migration problem, although he had not contributed to it
more than his neighbors, anything more than a minimal exaction, if at all,
may be unconstitutional. 45
The second interpretation is more consistent with Dolan's holding
and favors the Town. In Dolan, the Court did not consider the plaintiffs'
historic impact on traffic congestion and flooding. It focused on the individual impact of the Dolans' proposed development.'" A roughly proportional exaction would not require a landowner to bear burdens that in
fairness the public should bear because the developer presently creates or
exacerbates a harm the Town can constitutionally mitigate. The individualized determination language merely mandates towns to consider each
applicant individually. Thus, Big Whiskey must only assess the degree of
impact potentially caused by the individual development on the wildlife
corridor, given the circumstances when the developer applied for the

242. The arguments proffered by property right advocates, such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, have garnered considerable support by the current Court. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), petition for leave to file amicus curiae granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (Blackmun, Stevens, Sourer, and Ginsburg, J.J., would have denied
cert.); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), petition for leave to file amicus curiae
granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
243. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4.
244. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (stating the government cannot "forc[el some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole")
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The Nollan majority also specifically
adopted this reasoning. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4. See also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1665
(1988) ("the avoidance of disproportionately placed burdens is the essence of the just compensation
requirement').
245. The viability of this interpretation is questioned because the developer presumably received
the benefit of increased market value for his land by leaving it undeveloped.
246. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
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subdivision permit."' That degree of impact would be great, since the
developer's land is the only remaining route to a critical water source.
His proposed subdivision would have a devastating effect on animal migration.' Therefore, the town may be able to justify an open space land
exaction to ensure wildlife protection without violating Dolan's holding.
C. Rough Proportionality May Encourage Outright Denials of Development Permits: A Digression to Lucas and Penn Central
Dolan's rough proportionality test escalates the difficulty of justifying conditional open space exactions because it compels towns to make
difficult and potentially costly findings. 9 Consequently, towns may
choose the seemingly simpler route of denying building or subdivision
permits all together." ° The outright denial, however, is a use restriction
that will invite the full panoply of economic takings factors.251 An outright
denial may not automatically deprive a landowner all economically viable
use, and a total deprivation is not per se necessary for a taking.5 2 Hence,
Lucas and Penn Central may become important corollaries of Dolan.
247. In oral argument, Justice Souter asked the Dolans' attorney about the potential denominator
of the rough proportionality test. Oral Argument, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (No. 93518). 1994 WL 664939, at *22 (Mar. 23, 1994). He asked whether the analysis begins with the site
in its natural condition before the land was settled. Id. The attorney responded that the year in which
the plan was adopted was the "snapshot" of the existing conditions from which to measure rough
proportionality. Id. at *22, *23.
248. No matter how obvious the affect, Big Whiskey would still have to make findings to demonstrate proportionality; probably using a wildlife expert. Tigard had to present more findings evidencing the relation between the exaction and impact of the Dolans' development despite the fact that
it was "axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious surface [would] increase the quantity and
rate of storm-water flow from petitioner's property." See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
249. McNeish, supra note 231.
250. In Nollan, the Court assumed that the Coastal Commission could have denied the building
permit entirely. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. In Dolan, the Court did not specifically state whether the
town could only require an exaction when-and only when-the city could deny the permit in the first
place. However, Justice Rehnquist asked in oral argument, "We take this case on the assumption that
the City could have denied [the building permit]?" Oral Argument, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.
Ct. 2309 (No. 93-518), 1994 WL 664939, at *4 (Mar. 23, 1994). To which Dolans' attorney responded, "yes." Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens observed that Tigard can "rightfully
deny the application outright." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. The Court examines factors such as the "economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action."
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987) (explaining that the character of the action is either a
direct physical appropriation of property or a regulation). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc.
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. County of Yolo. 477
U.S. 340, 348 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 184 (1985) (developer had a reasonable investment backed expectation to complete a land development project); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
252. See, e.g., Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991). The Federal Court of Appeals found a taking when a
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In Lucas, 3 the Court focused on productive uses of the land.5 4 Thus,
returning to the developer in the wildlife corridor, if he still could exclude
others from his land, charge hunting fees or ranch the land, a denial of his
subdivision permit still allows productive uses of the land. 5 Whether a taking occurs depends on this developer's reasonable investment backed expectations. 6 If his expectations are such that he cannot realize a sufficient return,
the requirement to leave the land undeveloped may be a taking. 7 Hunting
and ranching may not generate as much revenue as subdividing and selling
expensive ranchettes. A complete denial of the subdivision permit may very
well operate as a taking if this developer's economic expectations are not attainable. Allowing some development away from the corridor, such as clustered housing, could solve any takings implications. Essentially, Rocky
Mountain towns may suffer a "Catch-22" between an outright denial and a
conditional land exaction because each method of regulating land use can
result in a taking.
Through Dolan, the Court expresses a policy against "disproportionate" land exactions." At the very least, it sends a message that a town

federal reclamation statute prohibited the plaintiff from coal mining despite its ability to farm 600
acres of the surface property. Id.at 1174. The regulation worked a "total destruction of all economically viable use." Id. at 1177. The plaintiff was entitled to $60,296,000 in actual damages plus prejudgment interest from 1977. Id. at 1178. See also Claire E. Sollars, Note, Natural Resources-To
Take or not to Take-Was that Question Really Worth 140 Million Dollars?Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991), 27 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 403 (1992).

253. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
254. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at2894.
255. Id.at2894-95. His productive use does not have to be "the best possible use of the land."
Agins, 447 U.S. at262.
256. The developer has ranched his land for over a hundred years. An open space exaction will
not prevent his historical uses. In Penn Central, the court observed:
[t]hat appellants may continue to use the property precisely as ithas been used for the past
65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions. So the law does
not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning
the use of the parcel.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984)
(reasonable investment backed expectation is more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract need).
A property rights advocate might assert that a landowner's right of alienation should allow
him to leave land undeveloped to enjoy market appreciations. But see David B. Hunter, An Ecological
Perspective on Propery: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally
Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 311, 332 (1988) ("The courts' adherence to an economics-based takings doctrine imposes on our society a particular economic system that prefers unchecked growth and development over stewardship and conservation.").
de257. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
nied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).
258. Findings made tosupport a decision tocondition a building permit on an exaction before
See, e.g., J.C. Reeves Corp. v.
suffice.
Dolan's mandate of rough proportionality may still
remand not required and
Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 363 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that
town's pre-existing findings satisfied rough proportionality).
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must tailor a land exaction to standards the Court believes appropriate. 9
Importantly, the findings necessary to support the standard are difficult to
establish. Dolan and its possible digression to Lucas' economic considerations impart considerable uncertainty and litigation on the goal of preserving western open space. The difficulty of establishing rough proportionality is elevated because towns now bear the burden to present findings to do so. Towns have to justify legislatively enacted exactions with
findings sufficient to withstand close judicial scrutiny.
D. Rough Proportionality Promotes Undue Scrutiny of Legislatively
Determined Goals
Rocky Mountain towns need ample park and recreation areas because
those features generate considerable revenue' and typify the Rocky Mountain atmosphere. 6 ' To retain this atmosphere, plans require open space exactions based on standardized ratios. For example, Jackson requires a park
exaction of nine acres per one thousand people from every new subdivision.' z Under this standard, a development creating one hundred new residents must provide nine-tenths of an acre of public open space.' Despite the
legislative determination that nine acres of park space per one thousand people is desirable and applies with equal force to all new developers, Dolan
may require the Town to produce findings that such a ratio is roughly proportional to the need for park space created by each individual subdivision.'
When the Town applies the exaction standard to a particular developer, the
Town is, by definition, adjudicating, and adjudication may trigger Dolan's
holding, together with a change in land ownership.'
259. Dolan "require[s] considerable particularity in local government findings." Id. at 362.
260. Jackson's plan identified that: "Ecologically sound land use policies will protect the area's
visual beauty, abundant wildlife and air and water quality, all of which are drawing cards for Teton
County's tourism-based economy." Plan, supra note 2, at 4-2.
261. The Colorado Supreme Court noted "a city whose civic identity is associated with its connection
with the mountains-preservation of the view of the mountains from a city park is within the city's police
power." Landmark Land Company, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Colo. 1986).
262. Jackson specifically adopts the nationally recognized standard of ten acres of park space
per one thousand people, but for unknown reasons, the regulations require only nine acres. Plan,
supra note 2, at 7-6. The exaction states: "The dedication of land area shall be nine (9.0) acres per
one thousand (1,000) residents and in accordance with adopted plans and polices." Land Development
Regulations, supra note 47, at art. IV, div. 49500(A).
263. This is demonstrated by a simple equation: 9 acres/100 people = X acres/100 people.
Solving for (X), the Town would exact .9 acres from the developer.
264. The town must make an "individualized determination." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
265. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316, 2310 n.8. But compare Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884
P.2d 569, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting argument that rough proportionality did not apply because an exaction was legislatively mandated), with Home Builders Assn. of Cent. Arizona v. City of
Scottsdale, (CA-CV 92-0210), 1995 WL 61490, at *3 (holding Dolan inapplicable to
non-discretionary interpretation of statutory mandate).
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It may be difficult for the Town to prove each subdivision requires
the same amount of park space for each individual subdivision.' Dolan
imposes a second examination of legislation by requiring rough proportionality between a standard exaction and an individual impact. As a
result, Dolan may unjustifiably force a town like Jackson to conclude that
a subdivision adjacent to a national forest does not create the need for as
much open space as a development in the middle of the Town. A developer may argue her development's proximity to the Bridger-Teton National Forest or the Snake River provides sufficient open space to comport
with town needs. The Town may argue that national forests do not provide the same localized recreational opportunities for the wide variety of
users that conveniently-located town parks provide.
Excessive judicial scrutiny of state land-use regulations is certainly not a
new concern,267 and Justice Steven's qualms with judicial activism encouraged by Dolan are plausible as well.26 When a town undertakes to regulate

266. The Wisconsin Court recognized the relationship is a difficult one to quantify: "In most
instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the land required to be dedicated
for a park or school site was to meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of the people
into the community to occupy this particular subdivision." Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
267. Regarding Mahon, one early commentator wrote "the decision may be another indication
of a recent tendency to narrow the scope of legislative power." Current Decisions, 32 YALE L. REV.
510, 511 (1922).
In takings law, judicial activism is not precisely analogous to Lochnerian substantive due process.
It is tied more to recent takings cases and possibly Mahon. The analysis historically applied in the land-use
cases differs from that applied during the height of the Lochner era, the primary difference being the Court's
determination of the right involved. In the land-use cases, the Court considered potential invasions of the
specifically enumerated right to keep one's property without an uncompensated invasion by the federal government. Cf. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 ("the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use"). Professor
Epstein goes so far as to say that property is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property as
a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187 (1992). But see Carol M. Rose. The Guardian of
Every OtherRight: A ConstitutionalHistory of PropertyRights, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 238 (1993). Conversely, in Lochner-type cases, the Court assumed the right to contract was embodied within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
However, neither the Constitution nor the Fifth Amendment, specifically protects an individual's right to
contract. Consequently, the resurrection of judicial activism from elements of the substantive due process
cases is largely without support.
268. Justice Stevens said the Court had "made a serious error by abandoning the traditional
presumption of constitutionality" for property regulations. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Before Dolan, Justice Brennan said the "Court impose[d] a standard of precision for the
exercise of a State's police power that has been discredited for the better part of this century."
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also J. Freitag, Note, Takings 1992:
Scalia's Jurisprudenceand a Fifth Amendment Doctrine to Avoid Lochner Redivivus, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 743, 747 (1994) (recognizing Justice Scalia's "resurrection [of] Lochnerian jurisprudence");
Alfred P. Levitt, Comment, Taking on a New Approach: The Rehnquist-ScaliaApproach to Regulatory Takings, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 197 (1993) (same); Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings
after Lucas: Growth Management, Planning, and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better than
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property, it expects considerable freedom to determine and enforce land-use
goals germane to its constituents. 2" While the Court should protect individual
landowners from state encroachment on constitutionally protected property
rights, it should not simultaneously usurp a state's power to legislate on
matters of health, safety, and welfare. 270 The Dolan majority has tilted this
delicate balance toward the private interest, causing undue scrutiny of legislatively determined open-space acquisition goals. Dolan's burden-of-proof shift
boarders on judicial usurpation of legislative power.27'
Though not readily apparent from the opinion, Dolan may have even
more far-reaching effects. The holding potentially applies to other methods of obtaining open space: land exactions through pre-annexation agreements and money exactions to finance open-space acquisitions.

III. Dolan's PotentialApplication to Land Exactions through Annexation
Agreements and Money Exactions
A. Annexation Agreements and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
In the Rocky Mountain West, development often takes place outside
town limits because county ranch land is a valuable quarry for eager
developers. 2" Conserving ranch land on town fringes can maintain open
space and prevent unsightly ranchettes from destroying the gateway-community atmosphere of many Rocky Mountain towns.273

To control development in outlying county lands, a town can annex the
land and bring it within its police power jurisdiction. 4 Annexation also pr-

Before, 22 STETsON L. REV. 409, 433 (1993); Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": The Remarkable Resurrectionof Economic Substantive DueProcess in ConstitutionalLaw, 17 ENVTL. L. REV.
10369 (1987).
269. In 1915, Justice McKenna said "[i]t is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of
the most essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable." Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (upholding zoning ordinance prohibiting brickyard within the city limits
against equal protection and due process challenges).
270. See generally Thayer, supra note 180.
271. See supra note 187.
272. See generally Mudge, supra note 66 (demonstrating impact fees used to preserve agricultural
lands); AgriculturalLand Reaches Highest Value Since 1985, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Jan. 13, 1995, at B3.
273. In the Rocky Mountain West, people can travel across miles of unspoiled country and suddenly
reach a quaint little town. "Gateway Community" usually refers to a town that borders large expanses of
public land or one that provides tourist accommodations. See John G. Mitchell, Our National Parks, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1994, at 2, 24-25, 35-36. In Jackson, the community said: "Much of Teton County's
ranchlands, with its pastures, hay meadows, and broad sweeping vistas, was [sic] zoned for development at
one unit per three to six acres. Dividing a 1,000-acre ranch into three-to six-acre lots does not preserve rural
character ...

or open space." Plan, supra note 2, at 1-2.

274. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-12-101 to -707 (West 1975 & 1994 Cumin.
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ovides public services, such as roads and sewers, that a county is not in the
business of providing. Before annexation, a town and a landowner may enter
a private pre-annexation agreement. This contractual agreement may contain
the town's promise to annex, together with guaranteed land-use regulations,
in return for infrastructure concessions by the landowner.275 In other words,
the agreement may contain conditional exactions. Some courts view the
agreement as purely contractual, making constitutional implications potentially
inapplicable.276 Because a town usually has no obligation to annex or provide
town services,' it could exercise considerable leverage over a developer
actively seeking annexation. 278 A town could aggressively solicit exactions

without fearing takings challenges by developers.279

In Dolan, Justice Rehnquist's controversial reliance on the "well-settled
doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions"' challenges the feasibility of exacting

Supp.); IDAHO CODE §§ 50-222 to -224 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2-4201 to -4810 (1993);
WYo. STAT. §§ 15-1-401 to -421 (1977 & 1994 Cumm. Supp.).
Annexation "serves to further important governmental purposes, such as the encouragement
of expanding urban areas and to do so uniformly, economically, efficiently and fairly, with optimum
provisions made for the establishment of land use controls and necessary municipal improvements".
Village of Orland Park v. First Federal Savings, 481 N.E.2d 946, 950 (III. Ct. App. 1985) Similarly,
the Utah Supreme Court said:
[T]here is a substantial difference between the relationship of the present residents to the
City, who are enjoying the benefits and bearing the burdens of city government, and the
non-city residents, who are attempting to adjoin and obtain the benefit of municipal services . . The expansion of the city results in additional demands on resources and services,
including water. We see nothing inequitable, unjust or unlawful about requiring the [developer] to make a reasonable contribution to the bearing of these added burdens.
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1975). Developers also seek annexation because
they receive the benefit of town services and some assurance of fixed zoning laws. Barbara Baran, /inois
Annexation Agreements-Are We Behind the limes?, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 727, 730 (1992).
275. OrlandPark, 481 N.E.2d at 950 (upholding pre-annexation agreement requiring contributions of
land and money under statutory authorization and case law); Child, 538 P.2d at 186-87 ("generally recognized rle" permitted city to condition annexation on transfer of irrigation water rights).
276. Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Development Co., 392 P.2d 467, 471 (Colo. 1964). In Kitty
Hawk, the subdivider wanted city water and other services. The city said it would annex the subdivision
only if the developer paid the city "eight percent in land or value thereof in dollars." Id. at 468. In upholding the pre-annexation agreement against due process and takings challenges, the court, despite a lengthy
dissent, said the relationship was purely contractual, and it "[found] nothing in the general law of this state
or in the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of conditions by a municipality upon one seeking annexation." Id. at 472. See also City of Aurora v. Andrew Land Co., 490 P.2d 67, 70 (Colo. 1971) ("clearly
within the power of the city to require the payment of annexation fees as a condition of annexation");
Schlarb v. North Suburban Sanitation District, 357 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1960). But see Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, 463 P.2d 26, 30 (Wyo. 1969) (stating in dicta that subject only to constitutional limitations, the legislature may annex at will).
277. Kitty Hawk, 392 P.2d at 472. But see In re Annexation of Territory in Olmsted Township,
470 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (decision not to annex was unreasonable); Lariccia v.
Mahoning County Bd. of Comm'rs, 310 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Ohio 1974) (ordering annexation where
evidence clearly showed annexation "would benefit the subject property").
278. McNeish, supra note 231.
279. McNeish, supra note 231.
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land through pre-annexation agreements. 2s° That a government may withhold
a discretionary benefit implies it may exercise the lesser power of granting
the benefit with certain conditions. 8' The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
limits this syllogism by preventing the government from offering a discretionary benefit only upon the surrender of a constitutional right without proper
justification.282 By offering a discretionary benefit qualified on a condition
that entails a person's relinquishment of a constitutionally protected right, the
government may coerce, 2 3 extort,2 or bargain 2o a particular action when it
could not constitutionally have done so in the first place.'s
As applied in Dolan,287 the doctrine prevented Tigard from "asking" the Dolans to sacrifice their constitutional right to just compensa-

280. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. But, Justice Stevens said in dissent: "[Dolan] inaugurates an
even more recent judicial innovation than the regulatory takings doctrine: the application of the 'unconstitutional conditions' label to a mutually beneficial transaction between a property owner and a
city." Id. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens accepts the doctrine as being
well settled regarding certain rights, he noted it has "long suffered from notoriously inconsistent
application." Id. at 2328 n. 12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37 (explaining that power to forbid construction of house "must
surely include" the power to condition the permit tobuild the house on a concession of property
rights); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-47 (1986); South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924).
282. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition
utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.")
For further discussions of the doctrine see generally Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton
Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473
(1991); Richard A. Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Linits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and ConstitutionalRights,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413 (1989); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional FederalSpending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103 (1987); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
283. Under this theory, the person has no real choice but to agree to the condition and thereby
sacrifice a constitutional right. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958).
284. In Nollan, Justice Scalia's holding intimated this theory of unconstitutional conditions when
he said "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'"
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)). See also
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 275 (1932)).
285. Early on, the Court recognized that the government cannot force a person to bargain away
his constitutional rights. Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535, 538 (1877). Professor Epstein argues a similar theory. See Epstein, supra note 282, at 15-28.
286. A state may not practice "leveraging of the police power." See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5.
287. Justice Rehnquist likely discussed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to support the
majority's patronage of private property interests. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist needed to rely on
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to support the Dolans' complaint that they had suffered an
uncompensated taking. Justice Stevens appropriately posits that no taking had occurred because
dissentTigard had not acquired any property of the Dolans. Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2328 (Stevens, J.,
ing). Without the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Dolans would lack a remedy since no
property had changed hands.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1995

43

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 30 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 5
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXX

tion in exchange for a discretionary benefit,288 the building permit.'
Tigard could not require the Dolans to donate the city property for a
bike path in exchange for a building permit, unless, of course, Tigard
could show proportionality between the bike path exaction and the

Dolans' impact. If the bike path exaction had met rough proportionality, there would have been no "unconstitutional" condition because the
exaction would have substantially advanced a legitimate state interest.
Express application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to takings law is fresh,2" but corresponds with Justice Rehnquist's conviction that the Takings Clause "as much a part of the Bill of Rights as
the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should [not] be relegated
to the status of a poor relation."291

Since a landowner may have no vested right to be annexed, a
town cannot grant the discretionary benefit of annexation contingent
upon his giving up a constitutional right-here again, the right to
compensation for losing the right to exclude. Applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to pre-annexation agreements assures parity

with Dolan's holding that a town must demonstrate that a conditional
land exaction is roughly proportional to the impacts created by a development. 292 Hence, Rocky Mountain towns might have to demon288. There is some question as to whether a building permit is a discretionary governmental
benefit. Justice Rehnquist did not address the dicta in Nollan which said: "But the right to build on
one's own property-even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.'" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2. But
see Been, supra note 282, at 484 n.61 (analogizing the "right to build" with a similar right subject to
state regulation, the "right to market one's products").
289. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v.
Bd. of Ed. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
290. Justice Stevens thought reliance on the doctrine was "assuredly novel, and arguably
incoherent." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Professors Epstein
and Sullivan observe that Justice Scalia had applied, although not by name, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in Nollan. Epstein, supra note 282, at 61; Sullivan, supra note 282, at
1463-64, 1505.
291. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320. Justice Rehnquist may have compared the Takings Clause
to the First Amendment to justify application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine since
the doctrine may only apply to "a preferred right normally protected by strict judicial review."
Sullivan, supra note 282, at 1427. See also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the doctrine is most frequently applied to First Amendment rights).
Elevating the Fifth Amendment right to keep property free of uncompensated invasions may be
analytically suspect. Under the Constitution, everyone in the United States can exercise certain
rights; e.g., the right to free speech and free association. However, an individual cannot exercise his or her Fifth Amendment property rights until that individual acquires constitutionally
protectable property, which is typically a matter of common and statutory law. Not everyone in
America is born with property, but everyone in America is born with the right of free speech.
Therefore, although certainly not a poor relation, the Fifth Amendment property right is fundamentally different from the First Amendment right to free speech.
292. In the case of pre-annexation agreements, the exaction is the developer's tendered consider-
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strate rough proportionality, like in any other conditional permitting
situation, making Dolan applicable to an otherwise effective alternative
to regulatory exactions.2 93
In opposition, a town granting annexation contingent on a land exaction could argue the contractual nature of a pre-annexation agreement is a
mutually beneficial transaction.29" In previous takings cases, the Court has
considered the landowner's reciprocal advantage.29 A developer should
realize no economic loss in an annexation agreement because he can
allocate the cost of a land exaction into home prices. In fact, annexation
allows the developer to offer new residents the benefit of town services.
Moreover, development located near public parks and recreation usually
reflects higher market values, suggesting that exactions and effective landuse planning are "givings," not takings. Land-use planning increases the
value of a community by providing a better quality of life.
B. Money Exactions: Dolan's Holding Should Not Apply
Western towns may use money exactions to finance open space
acquisitions and public services necessitated by looming growth and
development.'
This is particularly important because smaller towns
often lack the financial wherewithal to procure large tracts of open

ation, but nonetheless remains a condition to a discretionary benefit.
293. Justice Stevens was vehemently opposed to Justice Rehnquist's application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
and citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) and Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987)). He asserted that a conditional building permit was a mutually beneficial transaction featuring an "average reciprocity of advantage." Id. The potential for reciprocal benefits is apparent regarding a pre-annexation agreement since the agreement is presumably
an arms-length transaction. But see Perry, 408 U.S. at 598 (applying unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to alleged non-renewal of employment contract).
Fortunately, Dolan should not affect other land-use regulations that can control growth
and enhance community character. Western towns still can establish zoning laws that allow only
certain types of architecture and building materials, building codes, landmark preservation/historical districting, and overlay districts are still viable land-use tools after Dolan. See
supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
294. Professor Sullivan argues that the conditional building permit in Nollan "furnishes in-kind
compensation for the easement. Acceptance by the homeowner of the trade constitutes the best evidence that the compensation is adequate. Within the particular structure of the takings clause, the
condition on the permit is justified.' Sullivan, supra note 282, at 1505. However, Professor Epstein
argues that a town operates as a monopoly because it is the only entity offering a building permit.
Hence, it can coerce the developer absent any market pressures. Epstein, supra note 282, at 90-91.
295. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) ("reciprocity of advantage"). In
Dolan, Justice Stevens supported a reciprocity argument and said "we should not presume that the
discretionary benefit the city has offered is less valuable than the property interests that Dolan can
retain or surrender at her option." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. See supra note 66.
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space.2' Should rough proportionality not apply to impact fees, towns
still can exact money to buy open space without having to prove rough
proportionality. But if Dolan does apply to money exactions, lower
courts will be predisposed to invalidate them pursuant Dolan's mandate of elevated scrutiny and rough proportionality.
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court intends Dolan's holding to
apply to money exactions.298 The Court recently granted certiorari to a California impact fee case.299 Although the Court remanded the case for consideration in light of Dolan, it did so without explanation. 3" Therefore, it is
premature to conclude that this automatically signifies the Court's desire that
Dolan apply to money exactions. While Dolan may appear to provide a
viable standard upon which to evaluate the constitutionality of an impact fee,
gauging a money exaction under rough proportionality, and its concomitant
burden shift, does not correspond with Dolan's reasoning.
The Takings Clause has been applied to appropriations of money,3"' but
courts seldom use a heightened standard of review to judge whether a taking
actually occurred.2 Courts apply a rational standard, rather than a strict or

297. The very small towns that are just beginning to feel the brunt of growth do not possess the
tax base from which to draw significant revenue.
298. Some lower courts have applied Nollan's essential nexus to money exactions. See, e.g.,
William J. (Jack) Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990);
Leroy Land Development Corp. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 733 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Nev.
1990). Some early observers conclude that Dolan does not apply to impact fees, but only to dedications of land. Robert H. Freilich, et al., The Supreme Court and State and Local Government: Small
Changefor a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAW. 623, 689 (1994).
299. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), vacated and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, J.J., would have
denied certiorari). In Ehrlich, a developer applied for a permit to build thirty "deluxe" town-homes in
an area designated for recreation. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. The city granted the permit, but
only if the developer paid a $280,000 impact fee to mitigate the loss of the recreation area and facilities. Id. The trial court held the fee was a unconstitutional taking. Id. at 472. The Court of Appeals
reversed and held that a "monetary exaction" must only be rationally related to the governmental
purpose of mitigating the loss of the recreational facility. Id. at 475-76. The court also said the money
exaction would even satisfy the heightened scrutiny test of Nollan. Id. at 476.
300. 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
301. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980)
(holding a statute authorizing retention of interest money on interpleader a taking). See also
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 968 (1984) (noncorporeal trade secret); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (holding that government's refusal to validate mechanics lien effected
a compensable taking).
302. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, it is difficult to determine the level of scrutiny the Court
employed because the defendant offered no police power justification for the deprivation. Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 163. However, eases have considered conditional impact fees in
light of Nollan. These cases either refused to accept that Nollan mandated a stricter standard of review for conditional exactions, or they acknowledged that if Nollan did mandate a stricter standard,
that standard was necessary only when real property changed ownership. See, e.g., Commercial
Builders v. Sacramento. 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to accept that Nollan mandated
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substantial evidence standard of review.30 3 In Dolan, Justice Rehnquist hung
his hat on the fact that the Dolans would have lost their right to exclude from
real property. 4 A money exaction does not involve the loss of real property,
nor does it entail losing one's right to exclude from real property.
Since a money exaction involves the "deeding" of cash, but not real
property, Dolan's holding is inapplicable. State courts already have accepted the change in ownership of real property as a justification for
invoking Dolan's holding. 3 5 The Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted
Dolan to mean that rough proportionality is triggered by a requirement
that the owner deed real property to the city. 3°6
More importantly, the Supreme Court in Nollan limited any type of
heightened scrutiny to land exactions." Consequently, reviewing courts

strict scrutiny, then applying a rational level of review to an impact fee); Blue Jeans Equities v. San
Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding "any heightened scrutiny test
contained in Nollan is limited to possessory rather than regulatory takings").
303. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874; Blue Jeans Equities, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. See
also infra note 308.
304. Justice Rehnquist said "[s]uch public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude
others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)); see
also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 ("when the character of the govenmental action is a permanent physical
occupation of property, our cases have uniformly found a taking to the extent of the occupation").
305. In a cursory fashion, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently held that Dolan was "generally
inapplicable" to a conditional impact fee situation. Waters Landing Limited Partnership v. Montgomery
County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994). In Waters Landing, the County required a money exaction or
impact fee from a developer before it would issue the developer a building permit. Id. at 714. The County,
by special emergency legislation, changed its money exaction statute by replacing the word "fee" with "tax"
and stated that the statute was now authorized by the County's taxing power. Id. at 715. The court rejected
the developers' argument that the tax was a duplicative property tax and violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 720-721. Instead, the court held that the impact fee ("tax") was a valid excise tax. Id. at 716.
Addressing and distinguishing Dolan, the court said the County imposed the impact fee ("tax") by a legislative mandate, "not by adjudication," and said the "tax does not require landowners to deed portions of their
property to the County." Id. at 724.
306. Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). Another interesting impact fee case is currently running through the Arizona courts. An Arizona court of appeals
recently held that the an impact fee was subject to the Takings Clause. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent.
Arizona v. Scottsdale, (CA-CV 92-0210), 1995 WL 61490, at *3 (Az. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1995).
However, the court found Dolan's holding inapplicable to the legislatively mandated impact fee because the statute provided no adjudicative discretion. Id. at *4.
307. The Court specifically limited higher scrutiny to the dedication of land. Justice Scalia said:
We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective [substantial advancing] where
the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (emphasis added). See also Waters Landing, 650 A.2d at 720-724 (holding
Dolan inapplicable to legislatively mandated conditional impact fee "tax" not requiring a deed of land
and used rational level of review to uphold imposition of fee on developer); Karl Manheim, Tenant
Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 881, 950 (1989).
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should review a money exaction using the rational level of review."0 8 If
the Supreme Court desires that impact fees be roughly proportional to the

harms caused by an individual development, the Court should not rely on
Dolan's facts and reasoning to do so.'
CONCLUSION

Not since the settlers, trappers, and gold miners of the late 1800's came
West, have the Rocky Mountains experienced such a rush on the land. Little
did the early emigres know that their footsteps would be retraced a hundred

308. Most states apply a rational nexus test. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. Scottsdale, 875
P.2d 1310, 1314-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v.
Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Calif. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Middlemist v.
Plymouth, 387 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Castle Homes and Development, Inc. v. City of
Brier, 882 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137
N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). Accordingly, courts defer to a legislature's determination that the fee substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
Alternatively, courts employ an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Cherry Hills Resort
Development v. Cherry Hills, 790 P.2d 827 (Colo. 1990); City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs
Arcade Ltd., 585 So.2d 324 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990); Sweet Home Water and Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington
Estates, Ltd., 613 So.2d 864 (Miss. 1993); Bogue Shores Homeowners Ass'n Inc. v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 428 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Robes v. Town of Hartford, 636 A.2d 342 (Vt.
1993). This standard also accords proper deference to legislative determinations.
309. Another potential method of protecting open space is a conservation easement, which
Dolan will not affect. Although completely voluntary, a conservation easement has the unique ability
to conserve immense tracts of spectacular land. For instance, an agricultural conservation easement in
Colorado preserved an example of "the most gorgeous Colorado scenery, like a moment of the Old
West frozen in time." Joanne Ditmer, Old West Locks Up Last Dollar:Ranch's Farm Heritage Ensured by Easement, DENVER POST, Nov. 16, 1994, at IF.
In a private agreement, the landowner donates a non-possessory conservation easement
which protects the property from development. UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENTACT, 12 U.L.A.
60 § 1 (1) (West Supp. 1988). Although hopefully not the primary motive, landowners who
donate a conservation easement are eligible for attractive tax breaks. See 26 U.S.C. § 170
(f)(3)(B) (iii), § 170(h), § 170 (h)(4)(iii) (open space) (1994). The specificity of the requirements in the Treasury Department regulations may render the tax benefits of a conservation
easement more difficult to obtain. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14 (1994). See also generally Matthew J. Kiefer, Creating Additional Tax Benefits From Qualified Conservation Easements, 15
REAL EST. L.J. 136 (1986). The conservation easement does not have to be granted in perpetuity;
but, to reap the tax benefits, Congress requires a perpetual easement. 26 U.S.C § 170(h)(2)(C)
(1994). The Code also requires a "qualified organization" to hold the easement. 26 U.S.C. §
170(h)(3) (1994). For example, in Wyoming, the Nature Conservancy holds conservation easements on over 41,000 acres of land. Tom Mast, Easements Protect Prime Lands Forever, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Dec. 12, 1994, at BI. Unlike many states, Wyoming has yet to adopt enabling
legislation to side-step the common law difficulties inherent in granting such an easement. See
generally Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1989). Although not necessary to conserve the landscape, public access to
lands subject to a conservation easement can be facilitated by recreational user statutes which
discharge landowner liability in certain situations. See generally Cathy Hansen & Steve Duerr,
RecreationalInjuries & Inherent Risks: Wyoming 's Recreation Safety Act, 28 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 149 (1993).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss2/5

48

Starritt and McClanahan: Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exact
1995

COMMENT

years later. Now, however, the inhabitants of the Rocky Mountain West
should understand the land's unique natural attributes and should act to preserve them for future generations. While it may be too late for many Rocky
Mountain towns to accommodate growth, Wyoming stands in the unique
position of being the last state in the Rocky Mountain West "to be impacted
by the exodus." ' 310 Fortunately, this position presents the State a valuable
opportunity to seize the future and preserve the existing quality of life that
many of its residents may take for granted.
Without open space, wildlife, and unspoiled landscapes, many small
western towns will succumb to sprawling development, subdivisions and
ranchettes.311 Preserving community character in these towns requires
effective protection of wide open spaces, as well as smaller portions of
land for parks, bike paths and flood control. Open space is the backbone
of most Rocky Mountain towns because it preserves scenic vistas and secures enduring habitats for various species of wildlife.3 2 Open space and
abundant wildlife in turn support valuable tourist and recreational industries which buttress the economies of many western towns.
Necessarily, these towns should manage growth and plan their future
by exacting open space from developers seeking a "free ride" on existing
public services and accommodations. However, Dolan makes exactions
more costly and subject to more "exacting" scrutiny because of its mandate for individualized determinations of rough proportionality. This
result may not be as menacing as it first appears and may provide an
impetus for careful planning. Making a large investment now, by way of
detailed land-use plans, may prove less expensive than the inevitable tax
increases needed to pay for the public services compelled by new growth.
Essentially, Dolan requires extensive findings from towns that need developers to take responsibility for the growth they help create.

310. Tom Throop, Executive Director of the Wyoming Outdoor Council, Lecture at the University of Wyoming College of Law (Mar. 16, 1995).
311. Flagstaff, Arizona has taken a progressive approach toward land-use regulation. Bruce
Babbitt recognized:
[tlhat is why people come to Flagstaff-you can smell the perfume of the pine forest in the
air. An extraordinary horizon is everywhere you look. It is perfectly reasonable to create
habitat valleys for the benefit of the entire community to protect wildlife and the overall
image of the town. Admittedly this detracts from the freedom of a landowner ... but in
the name of the overall environment of this town, there will be some restrictions on landowners. The good residents of Flagstaff accepted that precept.
Bruce Babbitt, The EndangeredSpecies Act and "Takings:"A Call for Innovation Within the Terns of
the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 360 (1994).
312. The Jackson community has identified visions such as "preserving the traditions and character of the Rocky Mountain West and Wyoming, . . . set aside for generations to come, scenic vistas
and wildlife habitat." Plan, supra note 2,at 1-6 & 7.
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Increased protection of property rights may be appropriate when a
landowner stands to lose his right to exclude or when the property is
forced into public service. However, state goals and findings also deserve
their fair share of constitutional deference. Jackson and similar towns
along the Rocky Mountain Range have spent countless dollars and years
devising comprehensive plans that utilize conditional land exactions: their
efforts are not unfounded nor unworthy. Unfortunately, they now are
subject to more onerous federal constraints.3t3
Rocky Mountain towns can overcome Dolan in several ways.
They can exact money from developers to finance open space acquisitions because Dolan's should not apply to money exactions. Dolan
only affects exactions that require land donations to the public. Rocky
Mountain towns also should actively preserve the agricultural land and
economies that distinguish many western communities. 34 Finally, they
should enact comprehensive land-use plans that utilize regulations
providing explicit guidelines for requiring exactions. Strict legislative
mandates should provide the ultimate "adjudicator" no discretion when
applying an exaction statute to an individual developer so reviewing
courts will not be inclined to consider the act adjudicative, one of the
prompts for applying Dolan. By enacting uniform exaction standards,
Rocky Mountain communities may have a better chance at preserving
their untrammeled character of wide open awe.
There's only one piece of dirt highway left in Wyoming-the road
over Dead Indian Pass. Soon it will be paved.3 15
SAM D. STARRITT & JOHN H. MCCLANAHAN

313.

Although Western states relish property rights, they will assuredly abhor a "federalized

code" of property law, especially one that imposes an "unfunded mandate." In fact, Wyoming recently enacted its own set of guidelines to aid in determining whether an administrative agency has effected regulatory taking. WYo. STAT. §§ 9-5-301 to -305 (1995).
314. A Washington court upheld a farm district ordinance by specifically endorsing the comprehensive plan: "Farmlands are important to the local economy . . . . The value of farmlands, however,
goes beyond economic considerations. Farmlands play an important role in the protection of fragile
natural environments . . . and contribute to certain wildlife habitat needs. In addition, farmlands
function as a valuable scenic and open space resource." Kentview Properties, Inc. v. City of Kent,
795 P.2d 732, 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).

315. Diringer, supra note 15.
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